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COMMUNITIES OF INNOVATION
Michael Mattioli
ABSTRACT—This Article examines and evaluates the theory that patent
holders privately self-correct the government’s excessive apportionment of
patent rights by means of various cooperative efforts including patent pools,
research consortia, and similar licensing collectives. According to some
experts, these efforts are proof that market participants have the wisdom
and the will to collectively disarm their patent arsenals in order to advance
long-term innovation. But until now, this theory of market self-correction
has not been evaluated through empirical study. Drawing on interviews and
original research, this Article provides an ethnographic view of collective
patent licensing episodes. Amidst these stories of success and failure,
cooperation and conflict, the picture that emerges is more complex than
theory alone predicts: government policies, the backward-looking concern
of litigation over existing products, and various social goals significantly
influence collective patent licensing. This study suggests some important
refinements to theory and points the way forward for industry, lawmakers,
and the public to begin a new discussion about the role of collective
behavior in our patent system.
AUTHOR—Microsoft Research Fellow, U.C. Berkeley School of Law
(Boalt Hall). The author would like to thank Microsoft Corporation for its
generous support. The author extends his deep thanks to Rebecca
Eisenberg, whose insights, suggestions, and valuable criticism made this
Article possible. This Article also benefited from the comments and
criticism of Gideon Parchomovsky, Arti Rai, Peter Menell, Robert Barr,
Mark Janis, Joe Miller, Mark McKenna, and Avishalom Tor.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article examines the bold and puzzling theory that self-governed
communities of patent holders are spurring innovation through patent
sharing.1 The hope that markets can effectively shed excess patent rights to
enhance dynamic efficiency sits at the crossroads of several avenues of
contemporary legal and economic thought. Whether this emerging theory is
supported, however, by the recent rise of high-profile patent-sharing efforts
led by firms, universities, and governments remains an open and urgent
question. By applying theoretical insights to a unique ethnographic study,
this Article examines whether patent sharing is properly understood as a
form of market self-regulation.2
Patents embody a bargain. In exchange for the promise of useful
innovations, society grants inventors an exclusive chance to profit from
their ideas. Thomas Jefferson, America’s first patent examiner, once wrote
to a Boston mill owner engaged in a patent dispute, “I know well the
difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public
the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”3 With
these words, Jefferson concisely and candidly framed the central challenge

1

See generally Jonathan M. Barnett, Property as Process: How Innovation Markets Select
Innovation Regimes, 119 YALE L.J. 384, 387–91, 432–37 (2009) (proposing that patent holders
purposefully share their assets under certain circumstances to further collective innovation).
2
The idea that intellectual property naturally evades excessive appropriation was expressed by
Thomas Jefferson. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 175, 180 (H.A. Washington ed., 1861) (“That ideas should be freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and
improvement of his condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when
she made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density at any point, and like
the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of confinement.”).
3
Id.
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behind patent law: crafting a property regime that does not overreach its
purpose.
Today, a rising chorus of critics argues that the U.S. patent system has
become too big for its own good.4 The past thirty years have been marked
by steep rises in the number of patent applications, issuances, and lawsuits.5
From 1990 to 2009 alone, the number of U.S. patent filings nearly tripled.6
Studies indicate that these increases do not stem from greater innovation,
but rather from the deliberate attempts of firms to increase the size and
reach of their patent holdings.7
The trouble with excessive patent coverage lies in the layered nature of
innovation. Just as Isaac Newton once spoke of seeing further by “standing
on the shoulders of giants,” today’s innovators must continually build upon
the work of their predecessors and peers.8 Inventions are not islands.
Excessive patent coverage, however, can lead to situations where research
and development projects infringe multiple patents held by different
owners. Even for large firms and institutions, identifying and licensing such
multitudes of patents is often too expensive and uncertain to justify. As a
4
Many books and academic articles on the subject of patent overbreadth have been published in
recent years. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 2 (2004) (“[T]he
patent system—intended to foster and protect innovation—is generating waste and uncertainty that
hinders and threatens the innovative process.”); see generally, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J.
MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK
(2008) (arguing that the costs of the patent system outweigh its benefits, in part because mechanisms
that might prevent patent proliferation are not working properly); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY,
THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009) (discussing, inter alia, the
proliferation of dubious patents and the harms of excessive patent litigation); NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 81–129 (Stephen A.
Merrill et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter NRC, 21ST CENTURY] (recommending improvements to the current
patent system).
5
JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 11–17 (characterizing these shifts as “the patent explosion”).
6
In 1990, there were 176,264 patent filings, compared to 482,871 in 2009. PATENT TECH.
MONITORING TEAM, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND STATISTICS CHART,
CALENDAR YEARS 1963–2010 (2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/
us_stat.htm. The number of patents issued during the period also grew from 99,077 to 191,927. Id. The
rate of patent litigation may also be on the rise. See, e.g., Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner,
Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 56 (2005) (“[T]he rate of [patent] litigation is rising among
small firms and firms with smaller total patents.”). But see Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman,
Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8656,
2001), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8656 (“[T]he growth in patenting has been comparable
to the growth of litigation . . . .”).
7
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863,
868–69 (2007).
8
Ironically, Newton’s famous quote is adapted from a similar metaphor used by Bernard of
Chartres. See THE METALOGICON OF JOHN OF SALISBURY 167 (Daniel D. McGarry trans., Univ. of Cal.
Press 1955) (1159) (“Bernard of Chartres used to compare us to [puny] dwarfs perched on the shoulders
of giants. He pointed out that we see more and farther than our predecessors, not because we have
keener vision or greater height, but because we are lifted up and borne aloft on their gigantic stature.”
(alteration in original)).
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result, cumulative innovation is discouraged—a condition Michael Heller
and Rebecca Eisenberg famously dubbed “The Tragedy of the
Anticommons”9 and which this Article terms “patent gridlock.”10
Two government institutions are typically blamed for this state of
affairs: The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).11 Since its founding
in 1982, the Federal Circuit—the sole venue for U.S. patent appeals from
district courts—has steadily increased the scope and power of patents. The
court has succeeded, for instance, in expanding the range of patentable
subject matter to include business methods, software, and human genes.12
The Federal Circuit has also developed and cultivated a high bar for
proving patents invalid for obviousness, and has made it easier than ever for
patent holders to shut down competitors’ businesses.13 The Supreme Court,
however, has curtailed this jurisprudence in a series of reversals.14
But the Federal Circuit may not be the only institution responsible:
some commentators believe that the USPTO’s patentee-friendly practices
have likewise contributed to the rise in patenting. Commentators estimate
that the percentage of patent applications eventually granted is high—

9
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698–99 (1998) (discussing that a “specter of rights” surrounding
patents may discourage investment in product development).
10
This term was directly inspired by Michael Heller’s use of the term “gridlock” to describe
transactional failures caused by excessive propertization. MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY:
HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES xiii–xiv
(2008).
11
See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 1–24 (summarizing trends under the Federal Circuit
and at the USPTO that have resulted in a greater apportionment of patent rights).
12
Compare State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373–75 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (establishing the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for patentable subject matter), and
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 959–60 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (disavowing the “useful, concrete, and tangible” test
and replacing it with the “machine-or-transformation” test), with Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218,
3226 (2010) (stating that the “machine-or-transformation” test is not the sole indicium of patentability
and refusing to categorically exclude software patents or business methods).
13
See, e.g., Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
10–11, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing that the Federal
Circuit has made obviousness too difficult to prove); Rebecca Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating
Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 889–902 (2004)
(documenting diminished consideration of PHOSITAs in the Federal Circuit and proposing a new
approach).
14
See, e.g., KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 418–19 (disapproving of the rigid use of the “teachingsuggestion-motivation” or “TSM” test to determine nonobviousness); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006) (announcing that injunctions should not be automatically granted
in patent cases, but rather, that courts should grant injunctions only upon careful consideration of an
equitable “four-factor” test); Transcript of Oral Argument, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct.
2238 (2011) (No. 10-290) (considering the appropriateness of the “clear and convincing” evidentiary
standard for proving patent invalidity).
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roughly in the neighborhood of 75%–85%.15 Reflecting on these trends,
some leading commentators believe that the USPTO and Federal Circuit
have together led the U.S. patent system into a crisis of excess.16
As one might expect, scholars have advanced a variety of proposals for
reforming these institutions. Some potential solutions would make patent
grants harder to obtain—for instance, through increasing application fees,17
fortifying the standard for obviousness,18 and increasing the rigor with
which patent applications are reviewed at the USPTO.19 Another set of
proposals would make it easier to prove patents invalid after they have
issued. Such ex post suggestions include removing or weakening the
presumption of validity that patents enjoy in court,20 revising appellate
standards of review, and expanding reexamination procedures at the
USPTO.21 Even bolder proposals abound, such as crafting a technology-

15

See Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Essay, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY
L.J. 181, 201 (2008) (stating that the USPTO “grants patents to more than 70% of those who apply”);
Cecil D. Quillen, Jr. & Ogden H. Webster, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office—One More Time, 18 FED. CIR. B.J. 379, 394–96 & tbls. 4–5 (2009)
(reporting an overall rise in the USPTO’s grant rate since the founding of the Federal Circuit that, when
adjusted to account for Refiled Continuing Applications, ranged between 77% and 92% during the years
1995–2007 and ranged between 67% and 78% during the year 2008); Cecil D. Quillen, Jr., Ogden H.
Webster & Richard Eichmann, Continuing Patent Applications and Performance of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office—Extended, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 35, 38 (2002) (discussing different methods of
estimating grant rate and estimating adjusted grant rate in which patents were granted on both parent and
continuing applications at 85%).
16
See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 3 (“The patent system is in crisis.”).
17
See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 687,
727–28 (2010) (proposing the argument that higher prices will work to filter less valuable patents).
18
See, e.g., John H. Barton, 2on-Obviousness, 43 IDEA 475, 492–93 (2003) (suggesting stricter
nonobviousness standards in some industries).
19
See, e.g., Nancy T. Gallini, The Economics of Patents: Lessons from Recent U.S. Patent Reform,
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2002, at 131, 147–48 (citing negative consequences of weak review standards).
20
See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (hearing arguments on this issue).
But see Mark D. Janis, Reforming Patent Validity Litigation: The “Dubious Preponderance,”
19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 923 (2004) (doubting that the presumption of validity should be altered).
21
Two forms of post-grant reexamination procedures are available in the United States: (1) ex parte
reexaminations, in which third-party challengers do not participate, 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–307 (2006), and
(2) inter partes reexamination, in which they do, id. §§ 311–318. The types of evidence that can be used
in these procedures are limited and the requirements for instituting post-grant challenges are strict. See
id. § 312 (requiring that challengers offer prior art that presents “a substantial new question of
patentability”). Some commentators have suggested that more meaningful review could be provided
though, inter alia, allowing post-grant challenges to be based on novelty, nonobviousness, written
description, enablement, and utility. See NRC, 21ST CENTURY, supra note 4, at 101. The America
Invents Act fortifies these provisions. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat.
284 (2011) (to be codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
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specific patent system,22 offering a limited number of tradable patent
rights,23 or even providing a menu of various types of patents.24
But a new theme in legal scholarship advances a fundamentally
different solution to patent gridlock. In recent publications, leading
commentators have suggested that the patent system can be remedied not by
the institutions that govern it, but by the very constituents it serves. The
answer to patent gridlock, these scholars believe, is patent sharing. In a
recent contribution to the Yale Law Journal, Jonathan Barnett proposed
that, given sufficiently low coordination costs, firms will invest in various
mechanisms to lower the effective level of patent protection in
overpropertized markets.25 One of the chief mechanisms Barnett discusses is
private “sharing regimes” in which rights holders formally pledge
nonassertion to facilitate cumulative innovation.26 In a similar vein, Robert
Merges has recently written of the market’s self-regulating “impulse” to
depropertize, as evidenced by research consortia and Creative Commons.27
These and similar arguments point to the alluring possibility that, at least to
some extent, innovation losses caused by patent gridlock can be overcome
by coordinated private action. This theory, termed herein the “Market
Correction Hypothesis,” could be a paradigm-shifting revelation: if
innovation markets require only time and favorable conditions, rather than
government intervention, then policymakers may not need to “fix” the
patent system at all.
The Market Correction Hypothesis poses an urgent question that
demands empirical study. Existing scholarship on this topic, while
immensely valuable, is based in large part on economic theory and
generalized examples, but not on the complex and often confusing realities

22
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1662
(2003).
23
See generally Ayres & Parchomovsky, supra note 7, at 881–93 (proposing a system of tradable
patent rights and explaining how such a system might work).
24
See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & Michael Mattioli, Partial Patents, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
207 (2011) (introducing two new types of patent rights dubbed “quasi-patents” and “semi-patents” that,
if incorporated into the legal system, would expand the menu of intellectual property protections
available to investors beyond the current binary one-size-fits-all system).
25
Barnett, supra note 1, at 412 (positing that, under certain conditions, “[t]he market will tend to
adjust excessive allocations of intellectual property entitlements in order to maximize the cumulative
stream of innovation gains net of transaction costs”).
26
Id. at 389 (introducing the term “sharing regimes”).
27
Robert P. Merges, A 2ew Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 184 (2004)
(“[T]he increasing importance of the public domain may represent a partial self-correcting impulse in
the IP system.”). Creative Commons is a nonprofit organization that provides copyright licenses
designed to allow and encourage intellectual property owners to retain some, but not all, rights to their
work. See About, CREATIVE COMMONS, http://www.creativecommons.org/about (last visited Mar. 9,
2012) (describing how Creative Commons’s “some rights reserved” model works).
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of patent sharing.28 Through empirical study, the Market Correction
Hypothesis can be evaluated, refined if necessary, and used to inform
policymakers. The value in examining property-sharing regimes has already
been vividly demonstrated in the field of natural resource sharing. Nobelist
Elinor Ostrom, for instance, sought to understand why shared natural
resources such as rivers and grazing land do not always suffer from chronic
overuse, as the proverbial “tragedy of the commons” predicts.29 This inquiry
led Ostrom to study natural-resource-sharing communities around the
globe—from remote Japanese villages to Swiss mountain towns.30 Ostrom
found that the structure and workings of property-sharing communities are
often highly contextual and cannot be adequately described by theory
alone.31
In a comparable way, this Article evaluates the Market Correction
Hypothesis by studying technological communities that share inventions—
“communities of innovation.”32 Unlike traditional “patent pools,”33 which
lower the costs of manufacturing existing products by bundling patent
licenses together, communities of innovation are primarily aimed at
facilitating the development of future products.
This Article’s method of inquiry is ethnographic rather than datadriven. Information was gathered from a variety of sources, including
firsthand interviews with experts at key companies and research
institutions, press reports, legislative records, and historical documents.34 By
synthesizing this information into a series of case studies, this Article aims
28
See Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 297–98 (2003) (“A standard response to [the concern about an
anticommons]—that market forces will motivate the emergence of patent pools and other institutions for
bundling intellectual property rights, thereby reducing transaction costs and permitting the parties to
realize gains from exchange—is an empirical claim that has not yet been borne out by the experience of
the biomedical research community.” (footnote omitted)).
29
See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 182–85 (1990) (analyzing research findings and concluding, inter alia, that the
Tragedy of the Commons is sometimes useful as a generalized model but that it does not always
accurately characterize the behavior of communities).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
In a recent contribution to the Columbia Law Review, Gideon Parchomovsky and I discussed the
rise of communal patent sharing and explored how “communities of innovation” could be finely tuned to
better serve their constituents. See Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 24, at 233–43.
33
See infra note 107.
34
This study stems from personal experience. In 2010, I served as outside pro bono patent counsel
to Creative Commons when it designed a general purpose open patent license. Our license directly
influenced the practices of The GreenXchange (GX)—a large patent-sharing initiative led by Nike,
Yahoo!, and Best Buy. In the course of our work, our group carefully studied the successes and failures
of similar communities of innovation, many of which have emerged in just the past few years. Using this
experience as a seed, I embarked on a broader study of patent-sharing efforts worldwide. My goal was to
evaluate the extent to which communal patent licensing is properly understood as a market “correction”
that will facilitate cumulative innovation.
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to provide a deep and nuanced view of the complex motivations, behaviors,
and contextual factors implicated by the Market Correction Hypothesis.35
Unlike a more exhaustive data-driven analysis, this study does not strive to
independently formulate a model of how markets behave. Rather, the
inquiry attempts to probe the applicability of an existing hypothesis.
The discussion unfolds in three parts: Part I introduces the dilemma of
patent gridlock and the controversial notion that self-governed communities
of patent holders can overcome this problem. Part II is an original
ethnographic study of patent-sharing communities infused with historical
insights. These episodes challenge the Market Correction Hypothesis by
revealing that cooperation among patent holders has been significantly
motivated by government policies and programs, by litigation over existing
technologies, and by charitable goals. Part III discusses the normative
implications of this study and offers a policy recommendation. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. OVERCOMING THE ANTICOMMONS
A powerful and puzzling theory is emerging among legal scholars: the
threat to innovation caused by the government’s excessive provision of
patent rights can be remedied through private cooperation. The hope that
technology markets will shed excess patents to encourage the research and
development of new inventions finds theoretical support from leading
scholars and, quite possibly, evidentiary support in a set of patent-licensing
coalitions led by large corporations.36 But perhaps this optimistic vision is
oversimplified. Drawing on legal and economic theory, the following
discussion explains the underpinnings of patent gridlock and the emerging
Market Correction Hypothesis.
A. The Dilemma of Patent Gridlock
The director of patent licensing at a major U.S. research institution
interviewed for this Article disclosed a surprising fact: most scientific
researchers at universities ignore patents.37 The director explained that the
35

See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 29, at 55–56 (explaining how in-depth case studies can be
abstracted in order to examine and advance theoretical understandings of collective behavior).
36
For a description of the theoretical support, see infra Part I.B. For a discussion of the possible
empirical support, see infra Part II.
37
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #5 (Oct. 7, 2010). Many of the individuals
interviewed for this Article only commented on condition of anonymity. As a result, some of the
interviews in this Article avoid references to specific individuals. This anecdotal comment made by
Source #5 is supported by well-documented evidence. See, e.g., John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley
M. Cohen, Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 305–07 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003)
(documenting the impact of patents on early-stage research and reporting that patents often go
unlicensed at early stages); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Working Through the
Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021 (2003) (same); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 2oncompliance,
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cost of locating and licensing the potential multitude of patents that might
cover any single avenue of research is often too high to justify.38 As a result,
the director explained, research is often pursued with disregard for patents.
If and when patents later come to light, product development is sometimes
abandoned altogether.39 Michael Heller recently reported an even more
distressing story from the halls of the pharmaceutical industry: Heller’s
anonymous source, the CEO of a large drug company, stated that his
researchers have developed an effective treatment for Alzheimer’s disease
that remains shelved because it likely infringes numerous patents.40 Going
public with the drug, the CEO explained, would likely drown his company
in litigation.41 Similar reports have surfaced in other industries.42
Patent gridlock of this kind was first predicted over a decade ago by
Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, who called the phenomenon “the
tragedy of the anticommons.”43 The proverbial “tragedy of the commons”44
often turns up in the press. If a resource—a lake containing fish, for
instance—is commonly held, individuals will use it as much as possible
because no single user will bear the full costs of overuse. Fishermen will
tend to ignore the collective long-term costs of their activities, drop their
nets en masse, and render the waters barren.45 Heller and Eisenberg, by
contrast, were concerned with the converse dilemma: the underutilization of
property that results from an excessive distribution of exclusionary rights
among multiple owners.46
The tragedy of the anticommons is not limited to the realm of patents.47
In fact, the effects of this problem are an everyday sight in some developing
cities. After Hurricane Katrina struck New Orleans in 2004, for example,
real estate developers leapt at the opportunity to purchase parcels of land
while prices were low.48 Despite these investments, however, large swaths
2onenforcement, 2onproblem? Rethinking the Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1059, 1063–66 (2008) (summarizing earlier studies); id. at 1098 (“Within the academy, scientists
generally ignore patents and rarely face patent enforcement.”).
38
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #5, supra note 37.
39
Id.
40
HELLER, supra note 10, at xiii.
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 31.
43
Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9.
44
This concept was introduced in an influential article in Science written by the ecologist Garrett
Hardin in the late 1960s. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
45
See Peter Passell, One Answer to Overfishing: Privatize the Fisheries, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
1995, at D2 (discussing the problem of overfishing as a prime example of the tragedy of the commons).
46
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699.
47
See, e.g., Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from
Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (utilizing the theory of the anticommons to explain the
phenomenon of empty storefronts in Socialist countries where property rights are highly disaggregated).
48
William Carlos Spaht, Note, Overcoming Another Tragedy in 2ew Orleans: Rebuilding in the
Wake of Kelo and Act 2o. 851, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1599, 1613–14 (2007).
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of the city remained in ruins for years. This was in part because many
construction projects could not begin without the permission of property
owners who had fled the city following the disaster.49 The challenge of
identifying and coordinating so many individual rights holders made
rebuilding costly and slow.50 Quite literally, houses “divided” could not
stand.51
Excessively fragmented property rights can also lead to holdup
problems. In China, property developers use the term “nail house” to
describe uncooperative homeowners who, like stubborn nails stuck in a
wall, refuse to be uprooted.52 Dramatic photographs of single homes
surrounded by bulldozers commonly appear in Chinese magazines and
newspapers.53 To the general public, nail houses are symbols of defiance in
the face of sweeping industrialization.54 To economists, they reflect
hardnosed bargaining: the longer these homeowners hold out, the better
their bargaining positions with developers become.
Heller and Eisenberg showed that tragedies of the anticommons can
also strike intellectual property markets. Long ago, manufacturing a
product—a steam engine, say—typically required licensing one or two
patents.55 But as technologies have grown more complex, so too have webs
of patent coverage. Today, the products that fuel our economy, such as
software, drugs, financial services, and the like may be covered by dozens
or hundreds of patents owned by a multitude of different inventors.56 As a
result, the relationships between patents, patent owners, and products are
49

Id. at 1614.
Id. at 1614–15.
51
A reference to Abraham Lincoln’s famous “houses divided” speech, given in Springfield, Illinois
on June 16, 1853. See 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 461 (2008) (“A house divided
against itself cannot stand.”). Lincoln derived this phrase from a Biblical passage. See Mark 3:25 (King
James) (“And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.”).
52
See, e.g., Howard W. French, Homeowner Stares Down Wreckers, at Least for a While, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at A4 (reporting on a homeowner who had attracted media attention for holding
out against land developers, despite significant pressure from private stakeholders and the Chinese
government itself); Richard McGregor & Sun Yu, China’s ‘2ail House’ Floors Developers, FT.COM
(Mar. 27, 2007 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f1c5bc28-dbff-11db-9233-000b5df10621.html
(reporting that the owner of the nail house demanded a price from developers that exceeded local market
rates).
53
Homeowner Stands Down, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, at A3, available at http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04EFDC1F30F930A35757C0A9619C8B63 (reporting that the
same property owner eventually reached an agreement with land developers).
54
See, e.g., French, supra note 52; McGregor & Yun, supra note 52.
55
See Robert P. Merges, Institutions for Intellectual Property Transactions: The Case of Patent
Pools, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123, 124 (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman & Harry First eds., 2001) (“A patent, for example, was
conceived as a property right over a single, coherent product occupying a distinct economic market.”).
56
See Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV.
1857, 1868 (2003) (“Cumulative innovation is the hallmark of high-tech industries such as computer
software, semiconductors, molecular biology, and pharmacology.” (footnotes omitted)).
50
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often nuanced and complex. Patent gridlock can occur horizontally—e.g.,
when multiple patents would cover a final product57—or vertically—e.g.,
when multiple patents would be infringed during different stages of a
research and development process.58 In both cases, assembling such
fragmented rights into useful mosaics of patent coverage can impose steep
transaction costs on would-be innovators.59
Ronald Coase showed that “transaction costs” are a natural and
necessary consequence of any property regime.60 In his classic article, The
Problem of Social Cost, Coase explained that transferring property always
costs more than a purchase price alone:
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is
that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on
what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the
contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms of the
contract are being observed, and so on.61

But beyond such ordinary transaction costs, additional costs arise when
a single product can only be developed by gathering various parts owned by
multiple monopolists, as is currently the case in technology fields where
excessive patent rights exist.62 This fact was revealed by the French
mathematician, Antoine Augustin Cournot. In an 1838 essay titled Theory
of the Mutual Relations of Producers, Cournot proved that the total cost of
purchasing complementary goods from multiple monopolists is always
greater than the cost of purchasing the same goods from a single
monopolist.63 Coase’s and Cournot’s enduring insights explain why

57
See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 699 (“A proliferation of patents on individual fragments
held by different owners seems inevitably to require costly future transactions to bundle licenses
together before a firm can have an effective right to develop [future commercial products].”).
58
See id.
59
See id.; BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76–77 (discussing the horizontal–vertical divide).
60
See Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369,
372 (2002) (discussing transaction costs).
61
R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).
62
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 297 (“Transaction costs mount quickly when the basic
research discoveries necessary for subsequent work are owned not by one entity, but by a number of
different entities.”).
63
AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RESEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF
WEALTH 103–04 (Nathaniel T. Bacon trans., Augustus. M. Kelley 2d ed. 1971) (1838) (noting “the
composite commodity will always be made more expensive, by reason of separation of interests than by
reason of the fusion of monopolies. . . . [T]he more there are of articles thus related, the higher the price
determined by the division of monopolies will be, than that which would result from the fusion or
association of the monopolists.”); see also BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76 (discussing Augustin
Cournot’s Theory of Complements).
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developing products that require patent licenses from multiple owners is
often inefficiently expensive.64
Like the nail houses that stall the development of China’s growing
metropolises, complementary patents can also allow their owners to
demand exorbitant “holdout” fees.65 If multiple patent holders each attempt
this negotiating strategy, the cost of developing new products can become
prohibitive.66 This observation, considered along with Cournot’s insights on
complementary goods, reveals a subtle but important point: patent gridlock
results from the distribution of complementary patent rights among
different owners, not just the sheer number of patents in a given market.
Patent gridlock is difficult to measure and quantify directly, but experts
have documented its existence.67 Stephen Maurer, for instance, described
the failure of a genetic patent exchange initiative led by research institutions
in the late 1990s.68 After years of negotiations and planning, the effort was
abandoned because the participants reached a patent licensing impasse.69 In
the field of biotechnology, Rebecca Eisenberg looked into similar patentbargaining failures that she learned of during her time as chair of the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research Tools.70
Likewise, Janet Hope reported on patent bargaining failures impeding drug
innovation.71 Among other anecdotes, Hope quoted a biotechnology
executive’s description of a decade-long effort to pool intellectual property
as resulting in “complete and total constipation.”72

64

BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76 (“[T]he price of the integrated product will be inefficiently
high—and output inefficiently low . . . .”). This problem is distinct from, and potentially more harmful
than, the static efficiency costs of underproduction and supracompetitive pricing that are part and parcel
of any patent regime. See id. at 76–77.
65
See Thomas F. Cotter, Patent Holdup, Patent Remedies, and Antitrust Responses, 34 J. CORP. L.
1151, 1160 (2009) (describing the holdup or holdout phenomenon in economic terms); Carl Shapiro,
2avigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 124–26 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001) (discussing the patent holdup
problem).
66
See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 4, at 76 (noting that holdouts can stifle product research
and development when multiple patent holders are involved).
67
But see, e.g., Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has 2ot Emerged in the
Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 450–54 (2009) (denying the existence of an
anticommons in the biotechnology industry based on empirical study).
68
Stephen M. Maurer, Inside the Anticommons: Academic Scientists’ Struggle to Build a
Commercially Self-Supporting Human Mutations Database, 1999–2001, 35 RES. POL’Y 839 (2006).
69
Id. at 847–48.
70
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bargaining Over the Transfer of Proprietary Research Tools: Is This
Market Failing or Emerging?, in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, supra
note 55, at 223, 223–50 (discussing factors that led to bargaining failures in the realm of biomedical
research and concluding that institutions to bring down transaction costs do not always arise).
71
JANET HOPE, BIOBAZAAR: THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 28–67 (2008)
(reporting on patent bargaining failures in the biotechnology industry).
72
Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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How did this situation arise? Experts believe that the answer is clear:
the government has made patents too plentiful and too powerful. Since the
Federal Circuit’s founding in 1982, commentators have documented the
court’s decisions extending the range of patentable subject matter to
include, inter alia, software, business methods, and genes.73 The court has
also been faulted for making it harder for defendants to prove invalidity due
to obviousness.74 But the Federal Circuit is not the only institution to blame:
Critics also believe the USPTO’s patentee-friendly practices (as reflected
by the high grant rates cited in the Introduction to this Article) have
contributed to significant increases in patent applications and issuances.75
Legislation has likely played a part as well. Congress’s passage of the 1980
Bayh-Dole Act, for instance, opened up publicly-funded research to
patenting.76 By freeing university researchers to seek patents over genes and
other research building blocks, and by limiting the ability of funding
agencies to mandate licensing, this law likely contributed to the patent
gridlock that commentators believe has impeded biomedical innovation.77
The significant rise in patent applications, issuances, and litigation in recent
decades has become a major theme of contemporary patent scholarship.78
Tracing the problem back to its sources, scholars have proposed a
variety of institutional reforms. Most proposals fall into one of three
categories: The first set of reforms focuses on enhancing “costly screens”
that act before or after patents are issued.79 The second set of reforms
focuses instead on enhancing the “quality screens” that act during the initial
prosecution stage or following patent issuance.80 The third category of
reforms focuses on reducing the power of patents in the courtroom. Such
proposals include, for example, abandoning or lowering the presumption of
validity that patents carry.81
More radical proposals have long been debated as well. Compulsory
licensing, for example, could reduce coordination costs to manageable

73

See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
75
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
76
See Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, §§ 200–211, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019–28 (1980) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–11 (1994)).
77
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 291 (noting that the Bayh-Dole Act likely contributed to
significant increases in research patenting that may hinder scientific progress).
78
See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text (listing several contemporary books and articles on
this topic).
79
See, e.g., Masur, supra note 17, at 688–91 (discussing the application of a costly screening model
to the procedures used by the USPTO).
80
See, e.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 4, at 184 (discussing post-grant reexaminations).
81
But see Janis, supra note 20, at 923 (calling into question arguments for altering this
presumption).
74
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levels by vesting the right to set license fees in an independent body.82 Some
scholars have even suggested doing away with patents altogether and
instead introducing a set of government prizes or auctions for new
inventions.83 While such proposals continue to stir debates among scholars
and lawmakers, patent gridlock may only continue to limit potential
technological advances.
B. The Market Correction Hypothesis
Can private cooperation increase the level of innovation in society?
This idea, termed herein the “Market Correction Hypothesis,” is the
synthesis—and in my view, the natural conclusion—of several converging
themes in legal scholarship and industry practice. If sound, the Market
Correction Hypothesis could have an important impact on innovators,
policymakers, and even patterns of industrial organization.84
In his writings on patent exchanges, Carl Shapiro helped lay the
theoretical economic underpinnings of this idea. Drawing inspiration from
Cournot’s research on monopolies, Shapiro argued that some forms of
transactional gridlock could be overcome by licensing multiple patents
under unified arrangements.85 By reducing the number of individual patent
licenses needed, such arrangements could lower transaction costs and
encourage efficiencies similar to those that Cournot identified under
monopoly conditions.86 Shapiro presented patent pools (wherein multiple
patents are licensed as a single package) and cross licenses (i.e., reciprocal
patent license agreements) as the two mechanisms that could achieve such
efficiencies.87
Oren Bar-Gill and Gideon Parchomovsky examined a slightly different
way that property holders can collectively stimulate future innovation—

82
See generally Martin J. Adelman, Property Rights Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of
Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 977, 1001–02 (1977) (explaining a compulsory licensing
system); Cole M. Fauver, Comment, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666, 668–74, 683–85 (1988) (same).
83
See, e.g., John F. Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 37 (2004) (proposing and analyzing a scheme of intellectual property subsidies).
84
Industrial organization is a branch of economics dedicated to the study of the structure of markets
and the strategies of firms that operate within markets. See, e.g., Note, Dissent, Corporate Cartels, and
the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1892, 1902 (2007) (defining industrial
organization).
85
See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 123, 127–29 (viewing patent pools and cross licenses through the
lens of the “complements” problem Cournot identified).
86
Id. at 123–24. Importantly, Shapiro recognized that the excessive balkanization of patent rights
threatened not only the production of existing products, but also the research and development of future
innovations. Id. at 124 (“[T]he prospect of paying such royalties necessarily reduces the return to new
product design and development, and thus can easily be a drag on innovation and commercialization of
new technologies.”).
87
Id. at 123, 126–27.
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through publishing, rather than patenting, scientific research.88 Challenging
conventional wisdom, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky explained that the
publication of research data, combined with the pursuit of narrow patent
rights, could benefit upstream and downstream inventors alike by fostering
cumulative innovation.89 Like Shapiro, Parchomovsky and Bar-Gill’s
position was primarily normative: they cogently explained the social and
economic advantages of information sharing, rather than describing it as a
behavior that markets necessarily display.
Robert Merges posited that the phenomenon of collective licensing
may reflect a limited market capability to “correct” for excessive property
entitlements. Merges first discussed this idea in an article that explored how
patent pools have sometimes arisen to break bottlenecks that prevent the
production of existing products.90 Citing several episodes of collective IP
licensing—including one examined in Part II of this Article—Merges
concluded that the distribution of intellectual property entitlements among
multiple owners can sometimes encourage investments in private exchange
regimes that lower the costs of repeat bargaining.91 In subsequent work,
Merges viewed patent licensing regimes as “private-ordering response[s]”
to anticommons dilemmas.92 For support, Merges cited two notable patent
contributions to the public domain: Merck’s decision to forgo enforcement
of its gene fragment patents and IBM’s investments in open-source
software.93 Merges suggested that such episodes “may reveal a selfregulating aspect of the IP world that is just now coming into focus.”94
Merges cautioned, however, that there is no reason to believe that private
exchange regimes will always arise to perfectly offset the costs of excessive
patent rights.95
Jonathan Barnett recently developed Merges’s suggestion into a formal
theory that innovation markets sometimes correct the government’s errors
of overpropertization by, among other things, collectively ceding some of

88
See generally Bar-Gill & Parchomovsky, supra note 56 (examining the trend toward unprotected
publishing of patentable material).
89
Id. at 1860, 1872 (discussing this strategy).
90
Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective
Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1340–58 (1996).
91
Id. at 1391–92 (“Where firms are involved in such transactions repeatedly, institutions for
regularized IPR exchange tend to emerge.”).
92
Merges, supra note 27, at 186.
93
Id. at 188–94 (discussing these two examples).
94
Id. at 186.
95
Id. at 203 (expressing qualified optimism); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 896 (1990) (recognizing that “[t]here
is . . . no reason to assume that when blockages arise industries will always turn to the deadlockbreaking solutions we have seen, patent pooling and cross licensing” and noting that government
pressure has been an impetus in at least one case of patent pooling).
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the rights patent law affords.96 Barnett’s theory is founded on the possibility
that “large resource holders do not simply seek to maximize initial
innovation gains . . . rather, they self-interestedly seek to maximize the
cumulative stream of initial plus subsequent innovation gains.”97 Building
on public choice literature, Barnett posited that market self-correction is
most likely to arise in technology fields defined by cumulative innovation
and in markets that enjoy low coordination costs.98
Barnett’s position draws on selected anecdotes. He cites a set of
historical episodes of invention sharing as evidence that markets indeed are
capable of encouraging future innovation by ceding patent protections.
These include: the pooling of automotive patents in the early twentieth
century, AT&T/Bell Labs’ decision to license transistor patents for low
royalty fees, the publication of knowhow and research data by large
corporate research firms including IBM, instances in which firms opted
neither to seek nor to enforce patents in the fields of biotechnology, opensource software and financial services, and various patent pools.99 Although
Barnett does not suggest that markets always work perfectly to overcome
all imperfections, he suggests, like Merges, that the patent anticommons is
not as “tragic” as conventional belief holds.100
These hopeful insights find something of an analogue in the work of
famed political economist Elinor Ostrom. As mentioned in the Introduction,
Ostrom’s firsthand studies of natural-resource-sharing communities around
the world revealed that rational economic actors are surprisingly capable of
developing private collective action solutions to problems of overuse.101
Ostrom’s work contradicted widely accepted theories on collective action
and spawned an important body of empirical literature on sharing “common
pool resources.”102
The notion that intellectual property markets are capable of curing the
converse problem of chronic underuse is appealing. Tragedies of the
commons and anticommons spring from the same source: the government’s
initial misallocation of property rights.103 As every first-year law student
knows, “property” includes rights to use and rights to exclude. When rights
to use are shared among many individuals, such as with fishing waters,
96

Barnett, supra note 1, at 442–43 (discussing investment in “transactional arrangements” designed
to lower patent protections and increase cumulative innovation).
97
Id. at 432 (emphasis omitted).
98
Id. at 424.
99
Id. at 434–37.
100
Id. at 431.
101
OSTROM, supra note 29 (discussing natural resource sharing).
102
See, e.g., Charlotte Hess & Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a
Common-Pool Resource, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (2003) (analyzing scholarly information as a
common pool resource).
103
See Heller, supra note 47, at 625–26, 667 (referring to the paucity of commentary on the
symmetrical relationship between commons and anticommons property).
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overuse (i.e., tragedies of the commons) can result. When rights to exclude
are fragmented among multiple owners, as in the case of post-Katrina New
Orleans, underuse (i.e., tragedies of the anticommons) can result.
Shapiro, Merges, Parchomovsky, Bar-Gill, and most recently Barnett,
have each contributed to a new vision of the relationship between
intellectual property holders and the public institutions that form our patent
system. The Market Correction Hypothesis posits that private actors will
sometimes respond to the government’s excessive provision of patent rights
through collective nonenforcement. Although it has been known since the
time of Cournot that aggregating complementary goods can lower
production costs, the crucial new insight distinguishing the Market
Correction Hypothesis from previous theories is its focus on future products
rather than existing ones. The Market Correction Hypothesis proposes that,
under the right circumstances, collective nonenforcement can lay the
groundwork for innovation.
To what extent does the Market Correction Hypothesis describe and
explain the behavior of patent holders? None of the scholars who have
contributed to this theory posit that markets are always capable of perfectly
correcting for excessive property rights. Moreover, a set of experiments
conducted by economists in 2006 revealed that in practice, rational actors
have far more trouble extracting themselves from anticommons dilemmas
than from tragedies of the commons.104 The study concluded: “[I]t is
inadequate to extrapolate findings from the commons to the anticommons
dilemma.”105 While these experiments do not directly contradict the Market
Correction Hypothesis, they call attention to the relative paucity of
empirical literature on invention sharing as compared to the far more
extensive empirical literature on real property sharing. As it stands, the
Market Correction Hypothesis is rooted in economic theory but has not yet
benefitted from the color, nuance, and complexity that only an empirical
examination can reveal.106
II. CURRENT AND HISTORICAL EXAMPLES
This Part examines communities of innovation by drawing on
interviews, independent research, and firsthand observations made during
my time as pro bono outside counsel to an emerging patent-sharing
initiative. The collaborations discussed in the paragraphs that follow are
ideal test cases for the Market Correction Hypothesis. Unlike traditional
patent pools, these institutions do not exist solely to lower the cost of
104
Sven Vanneste, Alain Van Hiel, Francesco Parisi & Ben Depoorter, From “Tragedy” to
“Disaster”: Welfare Effects of Commons and Anticommons Dilemmas, 26 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 104
(2006).
105
Id. at 118.
106
See Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28 (stating that, in the biomedical research community, the
Market Correction Hypothesis “is an empirical claim that has not yet been borne out”).
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producing existing products, but rather, they purport to encourage the
research and development of products that do not yet exist.107 Contributors
to these initiatives include corporate juggernauts such as HP, IBM,
Ericsson, Nokia, Sony, Nike, Yahoo!, Best Buy, and GlaxoSmithKline
(GSK), as well as several major research institutions and the governments
of the United States and South Africa. This study provides a rare look at
collective patent licensing from the perspectives of those involved.
Three themes emerge from this investigation, each of which is
elaborated upon below. First, government often plays an important role in
encouraging communities of innovation. This fact challenges the Market
Correction Hypothesis’s depiction of private actors correcting government
propertization errors. Second, some patent-sharing efforts are, contrary to
public statements, focused more on the near-term goal of avoiding or
settling litigation over existing products than on the more forward-looking
goal of encouraging research and development. Third, some communities of
innovation are charitable in nature, suggesting that, contrary to the Market
Correction Hypothesis, they are motivated more by social goals than by
private profits. These themes shed new light on the role of collective action
in technology markets.
A. Government-Influenced Communities
The Market Correction Hypothesis posits that sometimes patent
holders respond to the government’s excessive distribution of patents by
cooperating. But the following episodes tell a different story. Here, through
exhortations, interventions, and the provision of incentives, the “visible
hand” of public policy guides patent holders toward cooperation and away
from patent gridlock.108
107

The term “patent pool,” as it is commonly used by legal scholars, describes a set of patent
licenses that facilitate production or assembly of an end-product that has already been invented. See,
e.g., Merges, supra note 90, at 1340; Shapiro, supra note 65, at 127. The first widely documented patent
pool in the United States arose in the sewing machine industry in 1856. See Merges, supra note 90, at
1342. In the late twentieth century, patent pools arose to facilitate the assembly of digital standards,
including MPEG video. See Letter from Joel I. Klein, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., DOJ, to Gerrard
R. Beeney, Esquire, Sullivan & Cromwell (June 26, 1997) [hereinafter MPEG-2 Business Review
Letter], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf. For an analytical discussion
of the antitrust implications of patent pools, see Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Efficient Patent Pools, 94
AM. ECON. REV. 691 (2004).
108
Economist Adam Smith coined the term “invisible hand” as a metaphor to describe how
atomistic, self-interested actors can unintentionally achieve efficiency in the aggregate. See ADAM
SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 215–16 (Knud Haakonssen ed., 2002) (1759) (“They are
led by an invisible hand to make nearly the same distribution of the necessaries of life, which would
have been made, had the earth been divided into equal portions among all its inhabitants, and thus
without intending it, without knowing it, advance the interest of the society, and afford means to the
multiplication of the species.” (footnote omitted)). The Market Correction Hypothesis can be
distinguished from Smith’s “invisible hand” because it posits the conscious and deliberate pursuit of
shared goals by small groups of private actors.
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1. The Medicines Patent Pool.—Today, the public sector is tackling a
patent gridlock dilemma that is quite literally a matter of life and death.
Experts believe that in the developing world, the health of millions of HIV
sufferers depends on the creation of new pediatric antiretroviral drugs
(ARVs) and so-called “fixed dose” ARVs that combine several medications
into a single pill.109 A former director of the World Health Organization has
called the ongoing lack of these drugs a “global health emergency.”110
Developing fixed-dose ARVs presents a textbook case of “horizontal”
patent gridlock: each pill contains multiple drugs, usually patented by
different companies.111 Because licensing the necessary patents presents
high transaction costs and opportunities for holdouts, the demand for fixeddose ARVs in developing countries remains unfulfilled.112 Aggravating the
challenge is the fact that pharmaceutical companies are often reluctant to
license their patents at lower rates in developing nations because the reverse
importation of cheap generic drugs into wealthy nations can undercut
primary market sales.113
Pediatric ARVs, by contrast, face a “vertical” form of patent gridlock.
Multiple patented research tools sit upstream, blocking the path to
downstream drug development. The difficulty of identifying and licensing
these patents, combined with the low demand for childhood HIV drugs in

109
See 152 CONG. REC. 14,436 (daily ed. July 14, 2006) (statement of Sen. William H. Frist)
(discussing why single-pill fixed-dose treatments will have a “profound” impact on HIV–AIDS
patients); ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GRP. ON AIDS, THE TREATMENT TIMEBOMB 25 (2009)
[hereinafter TREATMENT TIMEBOMB], available at http://www.thebody.com/content/art52841.html
(“There is an urgent need for new formulations of HIV medicines for children and for drugs that are
easier to use such as small tablets.”); Amir Attaran, AIDS Medicine Patents Cause a Problem, FIN.
TIMES (London), June 21, 2004, at 10 (explaining that “[u]nreliable supply chains in Africa make it”
difficult for patients to receive regular, unbroken, and simultaneous doses of the three or more necessary
medicines, and that combining the drugs into a single pill could solve this problem).
110
Lee Jong-wook, Former Dir.-Gen., World Health Org., Speech at Press Conference on AIDS
Treatment Global Health Emergency (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.who.int/dg/lee/speeches/
2003/AIDS_treatment_pressconference/en (“Our failure to deliver antiretroviral treatment for AIDS to
the millions of people who need it is a global health emergency.”).
111
See supra note 59 and accompanying text (explaining horizontal and vertical patent gridlock).
112
While this problem affects developed countries as well, unreliable supply chains make it even
more difficult to aggregate necessary drugs in Africa. See, e.g., Attaran, supra note 109 (explaining how
the failure of pharmaceutical patent holders to cooperate has impeded the production of fixed-dose
pills).
113
The threat is so great that, in 2001, thirty-nine drug firms (and one individual) instituted a legal
action to stop the government of South Africa from passing a law that would allow imports of generic
HIV–AIDS drugs. See Pharm. Mfrs.’ Ass’n of S. Afr. v. Mandela, High Court of South Africa,
Transvaal Provincial Division, No. 4183/98 (2001), available at http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/
MTCTPrevention/pharmace.txt. Only in the face of immense public pressure did the companies
withdraw the suit in 2001. Ben Hirschler, Glaxo Gives Up Rights to AIDS Drugs in South Africa,
REUTERS NEWMEDIA (Oct. 6, 2001), http://www.aegis.com/news/re/2001/RE011009.html (“39
pharmaceutical companies backed down in a landmark court battle with the South African
government.”).
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wealthy nations (where most drug research takes place), have significantly
hindered research.114 In poor nations, this transactional blockade has had
grave consequences: The humanitarian organization Médecins Sans
Frontières claims that the scarcity of pediatric ARVs significantly
contributes to the high mortality rates of HIV sufferers under age two.115
In 2008, a group of policymakers within the World Health
Organization—The Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health,
Innovation, and Intellectual Property—suggested a solution: If
pharmaceutical companies could be convinced to collectively license their
patents, AIDS-related drugs could be researched, developed, and
manufactured for use in poor countries.116 The plan was starkly simple. In
exchange for royalties on product sales, patent holders would be asked to
extend licenses to drug developers to facilitate research and development on
pediatric ARV formulations and production of fixed-dose pills.117 Soon after
the idea was proposed, UNITAID, an independent agency hosted by the
World Health Organization, made plans for launching and administering the
effort.118
U.K. politicians and officials were supportive. In January 2009, over
150 members of the U.K. Parliament (MPs) signed a parliamentary petition
applauding UNITAID’s proposed patent pool and calling on pharmaceutical
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In the United States and Europe, there is a nearly 0% rate of HIV infections among children
under age fifteen. UNAIDS, UNICEF, A CALL TO ACTION: CHILDREN: THE MISSING FACE OF AIDS 6
(2005); see also TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 109, at 25 (“There is a lack of investment into
medicines that are appropriate for children, because of the very limited commercial, developed country
market for them.”); Brenda Waning et al., The Global Pediatric Antiretroviral Market: Analyses of
Product Availability and Utilization Reveal Challenges for Development of Pediatric Formulations and
HIV/AIDS Treatment in Children, 10 BMC PEDIATRICS 2010 74, 75 (2010) (highlighting the nearelimination of HIV in children from the United States and Europe and the corresponding minimal
demand for pediatric ARVs in these markets as a strong disincentive to the development).
115
See Children Being 2eglected in AIDS Fight, Says MSF, MÉDECINS SANS
FRONTIÈRES/DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS (July 13, 2004), http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
news/article.cfm?id=712&cat=field-news; Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without
Borders, Drug Companies Leave Children with AIDS to Fend for Themselves (Nov. 28, 2005),
available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=1628.
116
Cf. World Health Assembly, WHO, Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA61.21, annex 14 (May 24, 2008), available at
http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/A61/A61_R21-en.pdf (recommending examining “the feasibility
of voluntary patent pools of upstream and downstream technologies to promote innovation of and access
to health products and medical devices”).
117
See TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 109, at 28 (discussing patent sharing as a vehicle for
facilitating the development of drugs that do not yet exist).
118
The Medicines Patent Pool Initiative, UNITAID (Mar. 2009), http://www.unitaid.eu/images/
projects/PATENT_POOL_ENGLISH_15_may_REVISED.pdf (describing how the UNITAID pool
would work); see also Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Effort for Lower Drug Prices Would Focus on Gaining
Patents, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at F6 (“[UNITAID] is endorsing the creation of a panel of experts to
explore the feasibility of a ‘patent pool.’”).
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companies to participate.119 In a March 2009 parliamentary hearing, an MP
urged pharmaceutical companies “to respond positively” to the proposed
initiative and to cooperate in order to improve access to HIV/AIDS drugs.120
In a BBC interview conducted that summer, the United Kingdom’s
International Development Minister echoed that sentiment, stating: “The
pharmaceutical industry has an opportunity to act now to help prevent
future human catastrophe. It is time for them to state their clear
commitment to make new HIV medicines affordable to those who need
them most, by working with [UNITAID] to develop a patent pool.”121
Leading up to the pool’s launch, industry support was weak.122 GSK,
the holder of several key ARV patents, told a group within the U.K.
parliament in 2009 that it did not plan to contribute its patents to the
project.123 (As of this writing, GSK continues to refuse to participate in the
effort despite mounting public pressure.)124 ViiV Healthcare, a joint venture
between GSK and Pfizer, also responded coldly.125 Citing these holdouts,
commentators from the fields of law and medicine urged world
governments to more actively push patent holders to share.126

119
Early Day Motion 1553—HIV Treatments and Children, PARLIAMENT.UK (Jan. 6, 2009),
http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2008-09/1553.
120
25 Mar. 2009, PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th Ser.) (2009) 289 (U.K.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090325/debtext/90325-0001.htm#
column_289.
121
Drug Firms ‘Must Pool Patents,’ BBC NEWS (July 15, 2009, 15:30 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/8150457.stm (internal quotation marks omitted).
122
Some drug companies have made positive statements to the press. For example, pharmaceutical
company Gilead Sciences stated: “We believe if structured appropriately, UNITAID’s patent pool can
play a critical role in expanding access to antiretroviral treatments for patients around the world.”
Andrew Jack, HIV ‘Pool’ Adds to Pressure on Drug Groups, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 16, 2009, at 16
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/561186aa-e998-11de9f1f-00144feab49a.html#axzz1cgYKXB7c.
123
TREATMENT TIMEBOMB, supra note 109, at 28–29 (noting GSK’s refusal in the face of “strong
political pressure”).
124
See, e.g., Philippe Douste-Blazy & Jorge Bermudez, Correspondence, GSK: Please Extend
Patent Pool to AIDS Drugs, 373 LANCET 1339 (2009) (“We invite . . . GSK to contribute to the
UNITAID medicines patent pool initiative and really join the sea change in the provision of medicines
to people in developing countries.”); Kate Kelland, Some Drug Firms Keen, Others Reluctant on AIDS
Pool, REUTERS (July 21, 2010, 2:28 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/07/21/us-aids-drugspool-idUSTRE66K2ZP20100721.
125
Kelland, supra note 124 (reporting on ViiV Healthcare’s statements opposing the Medicines
Patent Pool).
126
See, e.g., E. Richard Gold & Jean-Frédéric Morin, Correspondence, The Missing Ingredient in
Medicine Patent Pools, 374 LANCET 1329, 1330 (2009); cf. Ellen ‘t Hoen, Correspondence,
Pharmaceutical Companies and the U2ITAID Patent Pool, 375 LANCET 30 (2010) (purporting to
correct some of the statements made by Richard Gold and Jean-Frédéric Morin). In an editorial, The
Lancet urged MPs to offer more vocal support for the idea of aggregating AIDS-related patents.
Editorial, Political Activism 2eeded for Patent Pools for HIV Drugs, 374 LANCET 266 (2009).
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UNITAID launched the Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) in December
2009,127 and the MPP became an independent, nonprofit foundation in
September 2010.128 Press materials on the MPP’s website stated that the
project’s goal was to facilitate the cheap production of existing drugs, as
well as the development of new fixed-dose formulations and pediatric
drugs.129 In this way, the resulting pool would straddle the divide between
lowering the cost of producing existing drugs and encouraging research on
drugs that do not yet exist. The MPP’s first step toward this goal was to
focus public and political pressure on the pharmaceutical industry. In
December 2010, the MPP sent public letters to ten pharmaceutical
companies asking for licenses on specific target drugs.130 Some of these
drugs were patented in wealthy nations where patents hold greater relative
economic value, leading a WIPO official interviewed for this Article to
opine, “The MPP might be more successful if it focused on [soliciting
patented drugs in] only the least developed nations, rather than pushing
hard for Brazil and India.”131
As of this writing, the MPP still lacks widespread support from patent
holders but there are signs of progress. In October 2010, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) agreed to contribute a set of patents covering the
drug darunavir to the MPP on a royalty-free basis.132 Ellen ‘t Hoen, the
MPP’s Executive Director, applauded this action but noted that “[t]he
practical usefulness in the short term of this particular license is not very
big” because the necessary patents covering distribution of the drug are still
held by outside entities.133 (All of the donated patents were granted in
127

U2ITAID Approves Patent Pool, UNITAID (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.unitaid.eu/en/
resources/news/237-unitaid-approves-patent-pool.html.
128
Memorandum of Understanding between the World Health Org. and the Medicines Patent Pool
Found. (Sept. 17, 2010), available at http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/208/1199/
version/3/file/MemorandumOfUnderstanding_MedicinesPatentPoolFoundation_14Sept2010.pdf
(detailing the World Health Organization’s commitment to a five-year funding obligation).
129
See, e.g., The Medicines Patent Pool: Stimulating Innovation, Improving Access, MEDICINES
PATENT POOL (Jan. 2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/311/2031/version/1/
file/FACTSHEET+FINAL+EB.pdf (stating that the MPP aims to lower the prices of existing drugs and
foster “the development of better-adapted formulations for developing country contexts, such as
medicines for children” and fixed-dose formulations).
130
Medicines Patent Pool in 2egotiations with Key HIV Medicines Patent Holders, MEDICINES
PATENT POOL (July 2011), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/Company-Engagement
(“On 1 December 2010, the Medicines Patent Pool sent out letters to key patent holders inviting them to
formally begin negotiations to license their HIV/medicines patents to the Pool . . . .”).
131
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #9 (Feb. 22, 2011).
132
See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., 2ational Institutes of Health Licenses Its Patent on a 2ew Drug for
AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2010, at D6; see also MEDS. PATENT POOL FOUND., Public Health Service
2on-Exclusive Patent License Agreement (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/content/
download/214/1227/version/1/file/MPPF+Patent+License+Full+Executed+%28Sept+2010%29-NS.pdf
(reflecting that the NIH license is royalty-free).
133
Asher Mullard, Straight Talk with. . . Ellen ‘t Hoen, 16 NATURE MED. 1351, 1351 (2010),
available at http://www.nature.com/nm/journal/v16/n12/pdf/nm1210-1351.pdf.
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nations where research, development, and manufacturing have traditionally
taken place, including the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and
nineteen high-income member states of the European Patent Office.)134
Hoen added, however, that the license does allow licensees “to do some
research with the protease inhibitor darunavir.”135
In July 2011, the pharmaceutical company Gilead Sciences agreed to
license patents covering four HIV drugs—tenofovir, emtricitabine,
cobicistat, and elvitegravir—to the MPP.136 The license allowed for
production of the four drugs in over one hundred low-income nations.
Officials in the United Kingdom and the United States applauded Gilead
and encouraged other drug companies to follow suit. The Minister of
International Development for the United Kingdom remarked, “The United
Kingdom has been a strong supporter of the Medicines Patent Pool from
day one. We welcome the news of their first pharmaceutical company
licence.”137 An advisor within the White House Office of Science and
Technology commented, “We hope additional public and private patent
holders will explore voluntary licenses with the Medicines Patent Pool as
one of many innovative ways to help improve the availability of medicines
in developing countries.”138
As of this writing, it is too early to tell if the MPP will facilitate
meaningful drug research and development. But in view of this initiative’s
origins and ongoing support in the public sector, it seems likely that
continued governmental support will play an important role in the MPP’s
future.
2.

The Pool for Open Innovation Against 2eglected Tropical
Diseases.—As the Medicines Patent Pool continues to take form,
another patent licensing initiative, The Pool for Open Innovation Against
Neglected Tropical Diseases (NTD Pool), reveals a different interplay
between public policy and private patent licensing. Unlike the MPP, the
NTD Pool is not motivated directly by policymakers but rather is designed
to leverage government vouchers to encourage participation.

134

See Current Licenses, MEDS. PATENT POOL, http://www.medicinespatentpool.org/LICENSING/
Current-Licences (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
135
Mullard, supra note 133 (discussing the need to get Johnson & Johnson on board, as they
possess patents necessary to manufacture the drug).
136
Press Release, Medicines Patent Pool, Medicines Patent Pool Signs License Agreement with
Gilead to Increase Access to HIV/AIDS Medicines (July 12, 2011), available at http://www.
medicinespatentpool.org/content/download/484/2863/version/1/file/FINAL+Press+Release++Medicines+Patent+Pool+First+Pharma+Licence%5B1%5D.pdf.
137
Id. (internal quotation mark omitted).
138
Hillary Chen, Medicines Patent Pool Agreement with Gilead a Key Milestone, OFF. SCI. &
TECH. POL’Y BLOG (July 12, 2011, 11:12 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/07/12/medicinespatent-pool-agreement-gilead-key-milestone.
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Originally formed by GSK in 2009 and currently administered by the
nonprofit BIO Ventures for Global Health (BVGH), the NTD Pool is
targeted at creating new treatments for sixteen tropical diseases, including
malaria, leprosy, and tuberculosis.139 Executives and lawyers within BVGH
who were interviewed for this Article explained that the NTD Pool is
entirely aimed at encouraging the development of new drugs—unlike the
MPP, which is aimed at drug production as well as research.140 In part, the
need for this research reflects the fact that the targeted diseases have a low
incidence in wealthy nations where drug research typically takes place.141
The NTD Pool’s focus on researching new drugs, rather than on
lowering the cost of manufacturing drugs that already exist, may explain
why the effort has already gathered significant support from major research
institutions, including MIT, University of California, Berkeley, and
California Institute of Technology. As the director of technology licensing
at a participating institution noted, patents are asserted less frequently
during early-stage research than during later stages of product
development.142 Another lawyer interviewed noted that there is likely low
commercial demand fueling the research of tropical diseases in the targeted
nations.143 Similar observations have led some pundits to criticize the NTD
Pool as solving a problem that does not exist. A founder of a prominent
nonprofit drug campaign commented to the 2ew York Times that
assembling a patent pool of drugs on neglected diseases was “a bit silly”
because patent suits over those rights are rare.144
Setting such criticisms aside, insiders interviewed for this Article
revealed an interesting and subtle motivation that may draw licensees to the
NTD Pool: the promise of obtaining FDA Priority Review Vouchers
(PRVs). Since 2007, the FDA has offered PRVs to companies that obtain
FDA approval for products aimed at tropical diseases.145 The vouchers
139
Press Release, BIO Ventures for Global Health, BIO Ventures for Global Health Chosen to
Administer the GSK and Alnylam Intellectual Property Pool (Jan. 20, 2010), available at http://
ntdpool.org/news/releases/bio-ventures-global-health-chosen-administer-gsk-a. The full list is
“tuberculosis, malaria, blinding trachoma, buruli ulcer, cholera, dengue/dengue haemorrhagic fever,
racunculiasis, fascioliasis, human African trypanosomiasis, leishmaniasis, leprosy, lymphatic filariasis,
onchocerciasis, schistosomiasis, soil transmitted helminthiasis and yaw.” Id.
140
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #7 (Feb. 7, 2011).
141
See Audrey Huang & Chris Weber, The Health of 2ations: Open-Source Research and the
Economics of Life and Death in the Developing World, 7 BERKELEY SCI. REV., Fall 2004, at 45, 47,
available at http://sciencereview.berkeley.edu/articles/issue7/disease.pdf (“Of the 1,393 new drugs
approved in the United States between 1975 and 1999, only 13 treat tropical diseases.”).
142
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #4 (Oct. 7, 2010).
143
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #5 (Oct. 7, 2010).
144
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Ally for the Poor in an Unlikely Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2010, at D1
(internal quotation marks omitted).
145
FDA Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 1102, 121 Stat. 823, 972–74 (codified at
21 U.S.C. § 360n (2006)). Significantly, the USPTO recently sought public comments on a similar plan
that would extend fast-track reexamination vouchers for companies that pursued “technologies and
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could be used to obtain expedited FDA review on future products of the
holder’s choosing, or alternatively, they could be transferred.146 One lawyer
from a participating research institution stated, “By shaving months off of
FDA approval wait times, the vouchers can be worth hundreds of millions
of dollars to drug developers.”147 The NTD Pool’s designers hoped that by
taking some of the legal uncertainty out of conducting drug research, the
effort would make it easier for researchers to apply for PRVs. Emphasizing
the significant draw that such vouchers could hold for the NTD Pool itself,
one lawyer opined, “The whole pool is geared toward FDA Priority Review
Vouchers.”148 Administrators at BVGH confirmed this view, noting that the
effort was “certainly designed with PRVs in mind,” and calling them “an
important incentive” for potential licensees to participate.149
As with the MPP, it remains to be seen whether the NTD Pool will
facilitate valuable drug research and development. On the one hand, the
effort has gathered hundreds of patents from several important academic
research institutions.150 On the other hand, despite its branding, this pool for
“open innovation” is not truly open to all takers. The NTD Pool’s
guidelines explain that the licensed patents may not be used without the
explicit permission of BVGH, which will conduct formal inquiries before
granting permission.151 Ultimately, then, the pool’s future may depend in
large part on whether it can effectively piggyback on the FDA’s voucher
program aimed at encouraging cures for rare and tropical diseases.
3. The S2P Consortium.—The SNP Consortium, a private project
launched in the late 1990s that complemented the U.S. government’s
preexisting efforts to build a database of valuable genetic information,
illustrates yet another form of interplay between government actors and
private industry.152 During the mid- to late-1990s, medical researchers
hoped to unlock the secrets to human disease and responsiveness to drugs
by comparing small variations in DNA—the tight coils of chemical
blueprints found in human cells.153 These DNA variations, called “single
nucleotide polymorphisms” (SNPs), however, are useful research tools only

licensing behavior that addresses humanitarian needs.” Request for Comments on Incentivizing
Humanitarian Technologies and Licensing Through the Intellectual Property System, 75 Fed. Reg.
57,261 (filed Sept. 17, 2010).
146
§ 1102 (discussing priority review and transferability of the vouchers).
147
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #4 (Oct. 7, 2010).
148
Id.
149
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #7 (Feb. 7, 2011).
150
See How the Pool Works: User FAQs, POOL FOR OPEN INNOVATION, http://www.ntdpool.org/
pages/for-users/faqs (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
151
See id. (discussing eligibility for licensing).
152
See generally GARY ZWEIGER, TRANSDUCING THE GENOME 177–89 (2001) (discussing the
formation of the SNP Consortium and the 1990s-era of SNP scientific research more generally).
153
See id.
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when aggregated in large numbers.154 Recognizing this fact, researchers and
business leaders alike feared that, by making collection of the requisite
large numbers of SNPs difficult and costly, the widespread patenting of
SNPs could spawn a new research anticommons that would stifle drug
research and development.155
Private companies weren’t the only ones concerned. In 1996, the NIH
publicly discouraged the biomedical industry from seeking patents on
human genes altogether.156 The NIH also stressed to grant applicants “the
importance of making information about SNPs readily available to the
research community.”157 Going further, the NIH advised that it would factor
the adequacy of applicant data-sharing plans into grant decisions and that it
would monitor the patenting behavior of grantees.158
The U.S. government also took direct steps to avoid the rise of an SNP
anticommons by creating a database to catalog SNPs. In December 1997,
the NIH funded and managed the formation of a new database called
“dbSNP,” which was designed to hold between 60,000 and 160,000
SNPs.159 A respected biologist who helped design the database stated at the
time that the effort aimed to prevent researchers from becoming “ensnared
in a mesh of patents and licenses.”160 By 1999, various NIH agencies had
contributed approximately $30 million to the project.161
Following on the heels of the government’s initiative and the NIH’s
hortatory messages regarding gene patenting, private firms launched a
similar effort in 1999. The plan called for the creation of a new entity, the
“SNP Consortium,” that, like the dbSNP, would place SNPs in the public
domain and thereby defeat third-party patent claims.162 The SNP
154

See id. at 177, 186.
See id. at 177–78 (noting that private pharmaceutical companies were concerned about the
propertization of SNPs); see also, e.g., Fiona Murray & Scott Stern, Do Formal Intellectual Property
Rights Hinder the Free Flow of Scientific Knowledge? An Empirical Test of the Anti-Commons
Hypothesis 25, 27 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11465, 2005) (finding
detrimental impact of patents on scientific publishing).
156
See 2HGRI Policy Regarding Intellectual Property of Human Genomic Sequence, NAT’L HUM.
GENOME RES. INST. (Apr. 9, 1996), http://www.genome.gov/10000926; see also Eliot Marshall,
‘Playing Chicken’ Over Gene Markers, 278 SCI. 2046, 2047 (1997) (noting that academics were
“worried that private companies wielding new technologies for scanning the genome [would] snap up
the SNPs . . . and patent them”).
157
Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 28, at 307.
158
Id.
159
See ZWEIGER, supra note 152, at 177; Eliot Marshall, Drug Firms to Create Public Database of
Genetic Mutations, 284 SCI. 406, 406 (1999) [hereinafter Marshall, Drug Firms]; Marshall, supra note
156.
160
ZWEIGER, supra note 152, at 178 (internal quotation marks omitted).
161
Id. (noting that the project’s founder had solicited $30 million from a consortium of eighteen
NIH agencies).
162
Id. at 177–78 (indicating that both projects aimed to prevent researchers from being “held
hostage to commercial databases” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Consortium officially launched in April 1999 with the support of ten large
pharmaceutical companies.163 At the time, the Director of the National
Human Genome Research Institution described this private effort as “nicely
complementary” to the NIH’s preexisting database created in 1997.164
Paradoxically, the SNP Consortium defeated the threat of patents by
embracing the patent system. Rather than merely publishing SNPs, the
group obtained SNP patents that it then transferred to the public domain.165
The SNP Consortium did this by drafting patent applications with statutory
invention registrations (SIRs) to disclaim rights.166 Robert Merges has noted
the advantages of this approach over publishing innovations to the public.
For example, the SIRs are more likely to meet the “enablement”
requirement of prior art because they are drafted by patent attorneys.167 As
Jorge Contreras has observed: “This approach ensured that the
Consortium’s discoveries would act as prior art defeating subsequent thirdparty patent applications, with a priority date extending back to the initial
filings.”168
By most accounts, the SNP Consortium was a success. By February
2001, the organization had placed 1.42 million SNPs in the public
domain.169 Instead of spending an estimated $250 million to identify
150,000 SNPs, the shared cost of the SNP Consortium amounted to $44
million and yielded 1.8 million SNPs.170 All of these SNPs were later
merged with those in the dbSNP database and made freely available to the
public.171
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Id. at 177.
Marshall, Drug Firms, supra note 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In this way, the SNP Consortium was different from a traditional patent pool or patent
commons—rather than licensing patents, the group defeated them.
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Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Policy, Patents, and the Design of the Genome
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Thomas A. Hemphill, Preemptive Patenting, Human Geonomics, and the US Biotechnology
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Winter–Spring 2003, at 315, 458; see also Marshall, Drug Firms, supra note 159 (reporting the initial
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Like the MPP and the NTD Pool, the SNP Consortium emerged amidst
public and private efforts aimed at the same goal of facilitating research.
Challenging the Market Correction Hypothesis, which envisions collective
patent licensing as an entirely private response to the government’s
provision of patent rights, this episode shows that government actors have
played a meaningful role in motivating private industry to collectively
depropertize the patent landscape.172
4. The Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association.—A glimpse even further
backward in time to the fierce aerial battles of World War I demonstrates an
even more direct example of government-inspired patent sharing. In the
first decade of the twentieth century, several different companies held the
multiple patents necessary to manufacture airplanes.173 Protracted litigation
between the primary patent holders, Orville Wright and Glenn Curtiss,
began in 1909 and dragged into the summer of 1914 when combat in
Europe erupted.174 In the view of some historians, the patent gridlock that
resulted from this dispute significantly impeded innovation in the American
avionics industry.175 Reluctant to take on new contracts, nearly all aircraft
manufactures raised their prices in anticipation of potential future
lawsuits.176 As fighting in Europe worsened and America’s involvement
seemed likely, the U.S. government’s demand for airplanes increased. The
patent blockade cried out for a solution.
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infringed their U.S. Patent No. 821,393. Id.
175
See, e.g., Bittlingmayer, supra note 173, at 232 (“[S]ome firms were reluctant to take contracts
because of the threat of patent infringement suits.”); Merges & Nelson, supra note 95, at 890–91 (noting
the corrosive impact of the Wright patent on innovation).
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In January 1917, three months before America declared war, a small
committee of experts appointed by President Wilson looked into the patent
problem and proposed a novel solution: The holders of all necessary aircraft
patents would transfer their rights to a licensing corporation called the
Manufacturer’s Aircraft Association (MAA).177 The MAA would be open to
anyone who wished to use the Wright–Curtiss designs for a $1000 initiation
fee and a nominal licensing fee of $200 per aircraft built.178 These funds
were to be distributed primarily between the Wright and Curtiss interests
until each received a sum of $2,000,000 or their key patents expired.179 In
this respect, the pool effectuated a settlement agreement between the
Wright and Curtiss interests that would permit airplanes to be constructed.
To encourage future innovation, the MAA also included a grant-back
provision that applied to after-acquired patents.180 Members of the
association that developed and patented new designs were compensated at a
rate determined by an internal Board of Arbitration.181 By the terms of the
MAA, royalties on after-acquired patents were only available for an
invention that:
secures the performance of a function not before known to the art, or
constitutes an adaptation for the first time to commercial use of an invention
known to the industry to be desirable of use but not used because of lack of
adaptation, or is otherwise of striking character or constitutes a radical
departure from previous practice, or if either the price paid therefor or the
amount expended in developing the same is such as to justify such
compensation . . . .182

When disputes arose, they were handled internally—there would be no
recourse to the courts.183
As with the present-day MPP, initial industry support for the MAA
was weak.184 The parties opposed the plan vehemently, asserting that they
deserved higher royalties, but “patriotic impulses” and government pressure
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H. Comm. on Patents, 74th Cong. App. 3 at 3058–125 (1935) [hereinafter MAA License Agreement].
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Id.
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See Aircraft Builders Deny Monopoly Aim, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1917, at 11 (discussing
criticisms of the MAA).
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eventually led both Wright and Curtiss to agree.185 Even so, gaining the
support of major industry stakeholders remained a challenge all its own.
Some within the industry believed that the MAA was not designed to
enhance cumulative innovation in the industry, but rather only to privately
benefit Wright and Curtiss.186
These and similar protests led the Attorney General of the United
States to conduct a deep investigation of the MAA pool with the assistance
of lawyers skilled in patent and antitrust law.187 After careful review, the
Attorney General issued an official opinion that the MAA was “not in
contravention of the antitrust laws of the United States.”188 This assessment
was based on several factors, chief of which were that anyone could license
the key Wright–Curtiss patents on reasonable terms and that members of
the association were free to license outside the pool if they wished.189 With
many of its concerns dispelled, industry support developed, and the MAA
patent pool quickly gathered steam.190 Overnight, the government had
helped transform an industry into a unit.
Antitrust regulators continued to give the MAA clean bills of health for
decades.191 In 1972, however, a court determined that, just as some initial
detractors had feared it might, the association was slowing innovation in the
aircraft business and benefiting only its owners.192 In 1975, the MAA was
dismantled in accordance with a consent decree.193
The MAA episode challenges the Market Correction Hypothesis’s
depiction of patent sharing as a private response to government “errors” in
the initial apportionment of patent rights. What this episode shows, rather,
185

Manufacturers Aircraft Association, Inc., Organized, 3 AVIATION & AERONAUTICAL
ENGINEERING 43, 43 (1917) (“When these negotiations were started the task of bringing all of the parties
interested together seemed insurmountable, but actuated by patriotic impulses it was finally
agreed . . . that the [MAA agreement would] be completed.”).
186
Interestingly, Leon Cammen, the Vice President of the Aeronautical Society of America, argued
that the MAA would impede innovation and would “keep the airplane in its present state of
imperfection.” Aircraft Builders Deny Monopoly Aim, supra note 184. The topic of patent pooling as a
cure for litigation is discussed in greater depth infra Part II.B.
187
See Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n. v. United States, 77 Ct. Cl. 481, 488–89 (1933) (recounting this
history).
188
Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n—Antitrust Laws, 31 Op. Att’y. Gen. 166 (1917).
189
Id. at 170–71.
190
See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing
Commons in the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 660–61 (2010) (“Largely because of
this functioning commons of patented inventions, airplanes were built, and the war was won.”).
191
See Bittlingmayer, supra note 173, at 234–35 (noting that the MAA received “numerous clean
bills of health”).
192
See Plane Makers Hit by Antitrust Suit over Inventions, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1972, at 3
(reporting on a Justice Department civil suit alleging antitrust violations).
193
See United States v. Mfrs. Aircraft Ass’n, No. 72-Civ-1307, 1975 WL 814, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
12, 1975) (ordering the termination of cross-licenses); see also Airplane Makers Agree to Settle ‘72
Antitrust Suit, WALL ST. J., July 16, 1975, at 15 (discussing agreement to end the MAA).
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is how various government efforts, from the committee assembled by the
President, to the Attorney General’s dismissal of antitrust concerns,
succeeded in encouraging a reluctant industry to cooperate. Robert
Merges’s earlier scholarship on the MAA supports this characterization.194
When the MAA is compared to the other episodes discussed in this
Part, a range of government involvement in collective patent licensing is
apparent. The MAA was purely a government creation. The MPP, by
contrast, emerged at the encouragement and prodding of policymakers and
officials. The SNP Consortium was a private response to the government’s
preexisting efforts to overcome a genomic anticommons. Finally, the NTD
Pool was designed to piggyback on—and in so doing, further the goals of—
an FDA voucher program aimed at promoting drug development.
B. Collective Responses to Litigation
Just as government can influence patent sharing, so too can litigation.
Patent holders seeking to settle or avoid costly lawsuits sometimes turn to
collective invention sharing as a solution. The following initiatives are
inherently concerned more with products that already exist (and are
therefore vulnerable to patent assertion) than with those that have not yet
been developed. As a result, some collective responses to
overpropertization are driven more by avoidance of immediate litigation
than by long-term promotion of innovation.
1. The Open Invention 2etwork.—The use of collective patent
sharing to defend software products from litigation is rooted in the opensource computing movement of the 1980s.195 The introduction of affordable
home computers such as the Apple Macintosh inspired a generation of
hobbyists to explore the craft of writing software code.196 The risk of
software copyright infringement, however, discouraged the development of
any useful large-scale projects.197 To overcome this threat, a grassroots
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As early as 1999, Robert Merges observed that some patent pools have only formed with the
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Nelson, supra note 95, at 891–93 (discussing the formation of the RCA patent pool).
195
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& THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (rev. ed.
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costs. Id. at 132–34.
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See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 154 (2001) (discussing
programmer Richard Stallman’s belief that “the rise of proprietary software systems [w]as a severe

133

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

movement arose around the idea of so-called “free software”—i.e., software
freed from most copyright protections.198 Key to the movement was an
innovative type of copyright license that granted broad use rights to
licensees who agreed to distribute the original work and any derivative
works on the same terms.199 This “viral” nature of so-called open public
licenses led to a flourishing of sophisticated “open-source” software
programs on which businesses and consumers continue to rely—most
notably, the Linux operating system.200
In the late 1990s, open-source projects like Linux faced a new threat in
the form of patent infringement litigation. Starting in 1998, a line of Federal
Circuit decisions established that software is eligible for patent protection.201
Because Linux was founded on an open public license that did not
contemplate patent infringement, the new possibility of patent infringement
suits cast a shroud of uncertainty over the operating system’s legal
viability.202
Experts believed that litigation was inevitable. As early as November
1998, a key figure in the free software community predicted that
“corporations hostile to open source will band together on this issue and
form an organization to enforce their intellectual property rights against
open source software.”203 In the years that followed, this fear was
galvanized by the saber-rattling of large patent holders adverse to the opensource movement. Microsoft Corporation representatives called opensource software “a threat to our very system of capitalism,” and ominously
noted, “The effect of patents and copyright in combating Linux remains to
threat to freedom and creativity” and his contention that copyright law “impeded the development of the
best possible software”).
198
See, e.g., JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 77, 94,
189 (2008) (discussing the free software philosophy, the potential complications posed by intellectual
property protections, and the possible solutions generated by “open source” software development).
199
See, e.g., Mark H. Webbink, Understanding Open Source Software, NEW S. WALES SOC’Y FOR
COMPUTERS & L., https://www.nswscl.org.au/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95:
understanding-open-source-software&catid=23:march-2003-issue&Itemid=31 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012)
(explaining how open-source licensing under the original GNU Public License works).
200
See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 60, at 371–74 & n.3 (discussing the power and potential of opensource software development).
201
See, e.g., State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (affirming the “useful, concrete, and tangible result” test for analyzing patentable subject matter
and permitting software previously considered “too obvious” to be patented (quoting In re Alappat, 33
F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994))); see also BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 187, 201, 210–13
(“Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has set software-specific precedents that essentially remove most
restrictions on abstract claims in software.”); cf. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3226 (2010) (stating
that “machine-or-transformation” test is not the sole indicum of patentability).
202
See, e.g., G2U General Public License, Version 1, FREE SOFTWARE FOUND. (Feb. 1989),
http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-1.0.html (containing no reference to patents).
203
Bruce Perens, Preparing for the Intellectual Property Offensive, LINUXWORLD (Nov. 11, 1998),
http://web.archive.org/web/19990225093703/http://www.linuxworld.com/linuxworld/lw-1998-11/lw11-thesource.html.
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be investigated.”204 The open-source community took these threats
seriously.205
Amidst these looming concerns, a patent-sharing community was born.
In 2005, IBM, which held a vested interest in Linux, approached the Novell
software company with a strikingly simple plan to reduce the threat of
litigation: They would convince a community of Linux-based software
companies to agree not to sue one another for using Linux.206 This promised
to create a community of nonassertion. At the same time, the organization
itself would build a portfolio of Linux patents through targeted
acquisitions.207 This portfolio would have defensive and offensive
potentials. It would prevent key Linux patents from falling into the wrong
hands and would simultaneously serve as a potential legal weapon against
“those who attack Linux.”208 This sword-and-shield plan was officially
launched as the Open Invention Network (OIN) in 2005.209
The prominent Linux distributor Red Hat was one of the first
companies to pledge its support to OIN.210 An attorney involved with the
effort and interviewed for this Article noted, “Panic is a good motivator.
Red Hat saw [OIN] as the fastest way to develop a defensive shield. They
also [believed the effort would] reassure the open source community.”211
For Linux distributors like Red Hat, “circling the wagons” in this manner
had distinct appeal. Red Hat held only five patents at the time of OIN’s
launch.212 Teaming up with larger patent holders such as Novell and IBM,
the lawyer explained, gave Red Hat and its investors a much-needed sense
of security.213 By contrast, IBM, which at the time was the single largest
patent holder in the United States, saw the OIN as an opportunity to
promote Linux as a viable competitor to the powerful incumbent, Microsoft
Windows.214
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See Christian H. Nadan, Open Source Licensing: Virus or Virtue?, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
349, 371–72 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.; see also Roger Parloff, Microsoft Takes On the Free World, FORTUNE, May 28, 2007, at 77
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See Frequently Asked Questions, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.openinventionnetwork
.com/press_faq.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
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2005, at C8.
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Today, OIN has the support and membership of over 200 companies,
including Google, IBM, Novell, Philips, Red Hat, and Sony.215 In the first
fiscal quarter of 2010, the group reported that the number of new licensees
was growing at a fast pace.216 Beyond the many patents held by its
members, the group itself has purchased patents as well. Most notably, OIN
acquired an important set of twenty-two Linux-related patents in early
2010.217 Experts believe that these patents, which Microsoft sold to another
organization in 2009, could have posed a significant threat to Linux had
they fallen into the possession of patent trolls.218
The OIN patent license, to which all members must agree, is primarily
designed to prevent litigation rather than to increase innovation.219 This is
reflected in the agreement’s broad scope. As mentioned earlier, OIN
establishes a network of reciprocal nonassertion promises by which every
member of the collective is permitted to use all Linux-related patents of any
other member.220 Moreover, the agreement licenses to all members the
patents owned by OIN itself.221 Under the terms of the license, members
promise to “grant to each Licensee . . . a royalty-free, worldwide,
nonexclusive, non-transferable license under [their] Patents for making,
having made, using, importing, and Distributing any Linux System.”222 In
return, OIN promises: “Open Invention Network® acquires patents and
makes them available royalty-free to any company, institution or individual
that agrees not to assert its patents against the Linux System.”223 As OIN

215
See OI2 Community of Licensees, OPEN INVENTION NETWORK, http://www.
openinventionnetwork.com/licensees.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
216
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NEWS, Apr. 18, 2010, available at Factiva, Doc. No. WLNW000020100430e64i0001h (reporting that
OIN signed forty new licensees during this period).
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See Nick Wingfield, Group of Microsoft Rivals 2ears Patent Deal in Bid to Protect Linux,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2009, at B1.
218
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earn money from lawsuits and settlements in patent cases” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 4, at 3, 159 (discussing patent trolls).
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defines the term, “The Linux System” does not include future software
releases with new functionality.224
This language has subtle but significant implications for OIN’s power
to encourage innovation. As a lawyer who helped draft the agreement
explained, by encompassing all member patents that relate to “the Linux
System,” the agreement aims to defend Linux users and distributors from
patent infringement.225 The license does not, however, require licensors to
identify specific patents that fall within this broad definition.226 As a result,
OIN does not deliver clear guidance to would-be innovators on their
freedom to practice specific patents. Moreover, the definition of the “The
Linux System” does not relate to future products with functionality that
does not exist.227 When asked about this difference, the attorney interviewed
candidly stated, “Some communities are freedom-to-operate driven, while
others are driven by defensive needs.”228 Thus, in discord with the Market
Correction Hypothesis, OIN seems designed to protect an existing product
rather than to encourage the development of new ones.
2. The Bessemer Association.—An earlier patent-sharing regime that
facilitated the production of existing products rather than the development
of future technologies arose in the American steel industry following the
Civil War.229 In 1865, railroad companies were the most important
purchasers of steel in the United States.230 Despite high demand, however,
very few American companies understood the science of steelmaking well
enough to produce it efficiently.231 As an apparent consequence, American
steel was expensive and in short supply.232
An enterprising young American named Alexander Holley traveled to
England in 1862 in search of solutions.233 There, Holley met with an English
224
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Bureau of Labor Statistics, Working Paper No. 368, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=466880 (noting that imperfect knowledge of metallurgy in the United States
during this period hindered production).
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SIR HENRY BESSEMER, SIR HENRY BESSEMER, F.R.S. 338 (1905).

137

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

inventor named James Bessemer who had patented a method of passing air
through molten iron that cheaply yielded large volumes of high quality
steel.234 Holley licensed Bessemer’s patents, returned to New York, and
established a plant to bring Bessemer steel to the American market.235
Holley’s efforts were derailed, however, when American inventor
William Kelly won an interference proceeding against the Bessemer patents
and received a U.S. patent covering the key method of oxidizing molten
steel.236 All the while, Holley still held the rights to practice other essential
aspects of the Bessemer method. As a result, no single company possessed
all of the necessary rights to produce Bessemer steel in the United States. It
seemed, in Holley’s words, that “[l]itigation of a formidable character was
imminent.”237
But Holley and Kelly ultimately avoided a lengthy legal battle by
cooperating. Out of court, the two patent holders agreed to pool their
blocking patents under a new corporation called “the Pneumatic Steel
Association,” or the Bessemer Association.238 For a licensing fee and a
promise to grant back licenses to all follow-on innovations, any company
could join the organization and gain the rights to produce Bessemer steel
free from the risk of litigation.239
In subsequent decades, the quality and quantity of American steel
dramatically increased—proof, some may surmise, of the Bessemer
Association’s power as an engine for cumulative innovation.240 But a deeper
look tells a different story. First, historians have noted that important
advances in steelmaking during this period likely stemmed from the rich
culture of information sharing that existed outside of the Bessemer
Association.241 Notably, the American Institute of Mining Engineers
(TAIME) began publishing a journal in 1871 devoted to the science and
practice of steelmaking.242 The journal, to which notable scientists and
engineers contributed, contained detailed descriptions of new steelmaking
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processes as well as discussions of experimental successes and failures.243
Second, the high rate of job turnover among engineers in the steel industry
naturally led to a great deal of valuable information sharing. As one
historian noted, “the five or six top engineers of the industry [met
frequently] to discuss common problems.”244 Third, Alexander Holley
himself, considered by many to have been a brilliant and prolific engineer,
independently published important technical information that likely spurred
cumulative innovation.245
There is no evidence showing that any significant advances in
steelmaking during this period were the direct result of the Bessemer
Association. In fact, some historians posit that the Bessemer Association
was responsible for slowing innovation in the steel industry.246 Moreover,
any innovation arguably facilitated by the Bessemer Association was shortlived. By 1877, the Bessemer Association effectively stopped new members
from joining and refused to renew the licenses of many existing members.247
Licensing rates were raised, and the small number of remaining members
collected huge profits and effectively controlled the market price of steel.248
Ultimately then, it appears that like the OIN, the Bessemer Association was
not designed to facilitate cumulative innovation but rather to clear a legal
impasse that prevented the production of an existing product.249 As such,
this example does not match the Market Correction Hypothesis, which
predicts that private actors faced with an anticommons situation will
collectively forgo the short-term benefits of patent ownership in exchange
for the long-term benefits that flow from innovation.
3. The Mines of Cornwall.—In the Earth’s ancient geological past,
the slow collision of two continents formed a belt of mountains that today
reaches from Portugal to the county of Cornwall on England’s
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southernmost tip.250 In the late 1700s, the ridge of valuable minerals below
Cornwall birthed a high-tech mining industry that made the region one of
the most advanced engineering centers in the world.251 It was the Silicon
Valley of its day.252
Mining in Cornwall was lucrative but often unpredictable.253 Due to the
region’s proximity to the English Channel, operations were frequently
disrupted by underground floods.254 In a quest to safeguard profits and lives,
the owners and operators of Cornwall’s mines (called “adventurers” at the
time) searched for efficient ways to remove water from their tunnels.255
For nearly seventy years, the most important technology used for
draining mines in the region was the Newcomen steam engine.256 Designed
and patented by Thomas Newcomen in 1712, the device was reliable,
worked by a simple principle, and was relatively easy to maintain.257 The
Newcomen engine’s high fuel consumption, however, made it very difficult
to use in mines where natural fuel sources, such as coal, were not readily
available.258 In 1769, Scottish inventor James Watt solved this problem with
an ingenious modification to Newcomen’s design that drastically cut fuel
consumption.259 Watt patented his modified engine and licensed it to mine
adventurers in Cornwall on agreeable terms.260
Before long, however, some mine owners felt that Watt’s licensing
fees had become unfairly high.261 Frustrated, they enlisted local engineers to
construct pirate engines that they put to work throughout the region.262
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Following a lengthy legal challenge, the courts affirmed the validity of
Watt’s broad patent and enjoined use of the pirate devices.263
After Watt’s victory in 1799 and the expiration of his patent in 1800,
Cornwall mining entrepreneurs collectively organized against the patent
system.264 In 1811, a group of mine “captains” agreed to place new steam
engine designs in the public domain by way of a new trade journal.265 At the
same time, most engineers stopped patenting their new designs—in part
because business owners were boycotting patented designs and also because
placement in the trade journal was good advertising for aspiring
engineers.266
Over the next thirty years, the average efficiency of steam engines
steadily increased—a direct result, historians believe, of the decision among
inventors in Cornwall to share designs and related technical information,
rather than to litigate.267 Historical records from the period also reflect this
view. As one mine entrepreneur wrote in 1830:
[A]s, since the time of Boulton and Watt, no one who has improved our
engines has reaped pecuniary reward, it is at least fair that they should have
credit for their skill and exertion. We [adventurers] are not the partisans of any
individual [engineer or engine maker], we avail ourselves of the assistance of
many; and the great scale upon which we have to experiment, makes the result
most interesting to us.268

To conclude that the tale of Cornwall supports the Market Correction
Hypothesis is appealing. Facially, this episode does appear to show “longterm industry players rationally seek[ing] to constrain property rights
protections in order to maximize the cumulative stream of innovation gains
net of transaction costs,”269 as the theory predicts. But the peculiar
economics of Cornwall’s mining industry reveal a more nuanced tale. Most
mining entrepreneurs owned shares in their competitors’ operations.270 As a
result, many adventurers directly profited from the aggregate performance
of their local district as a whole as compared to the performance of
neighboring mining districts.271 In the absence of this unique incentive
263
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structure, it is not at all clear that Cornwall would have blossomed into the
community of innovation that it became.
C. Charitable Communities
The patent-sharing regimes discussed in this Part have a charitable
aspect to them, suggesting that they are motivated more by social goals than
by private gain. As with the litigation-inspired episodes discussed earlier,
these examples reveal that the aim of a patent-sharing community can
govern what it will accomplish. Here, broad philanthropic goals motivate
the sharing of diverse sets of patents that are not necessarily interrelated and
therefore not the basis for patent gridlock. Thus, while the following
initiatives may be of significant social value, they do not support the Market
Correction Hypothesis.
1. The Eco-Patent Commons.—On its face, the problem of
environmental harm seems almost too vast to tackle. It is a puzzle with
political, economic, and social dimensions, the effects of which are as farreaching as global climate change and yet as immediate as the quality of
water and air. Experts believe that behind all this complexity, however, lies
a simple promise: cleaner technologies can help. Over the past two decades,
world governments have worked in earnest to encourage so-called “green”
innovation in the private sector. In the past year alone, the USPTO
implemented a “fast track” program under which patent applications for
environmentally friendly inventions will be processed more quickly than
standard patents.272 Recognizing the need to encourage green technologies,
some nations have called for treaties weakening the enforceability of
patents related to ecological sustainability. In the 2008 United Nations
Framework on Climate Change, for example, China pushed for weaker

272
Pilot Program for Green Technologies Including Greenhouse Gas Reduction, 74 Fed. Reg.
64,666 (Dec. 8, 2009); Press Release, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, The U.S. Commerce
Department’s Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) Will Pilot a Program to Accelerate the
Examination of Certain Green Technology Patent Applications (Dec. 7, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/pr/2009/09_33.jsp.
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protection of climate-related patents.273 U.S. lawmakers have introduced
bills that explicitly reject this approach, however.274
Against this backdrop, an unlikely champion of weaker patent
enforcement has recently emerged. In 2008, IBM Corporation, the largest
patent holder in the United States, led a collaboration to pool green patents
on a royalty-free basis. The same year, the Eco-Patent Commons (EPC) was
formally announced as a partnership among IBM, Pitney-Bowes, and Sony,
with organizational support from the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development.275
The EPC is open to any patent holder willing to donate
environmentally beneficial innovations to the public without royalties. The
EPC website explains the project’s mission:
•

To provide an avenue by which innovations and solutions may
be easily shared to accelerate and facilitate implementation to
protect the environment and perhaps lead to further
innovation;

273

See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term
Coop. Action Under the Convention, Bonn, F.R.G., June 1–12, 2009, Negotiating Text, ¶¶ 187–89, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/8 (May 19, 2009), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/
awglca6/eng/08.pdf (encouraging the development of “climate-friendly technologies” by proposing the
removal of intellectual property “barriers to development and [the] transfer of technologies from
developed to developing countr[ies]” or the exemption “from patent protection of climate-related
technologies” for the least-developed countries); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Comment, Addressing the
Green Patent Global Deadlock Through Bayh-Dole Reform, 119 YALE L.J. 1727, 1727 (2010) (“During
climate treaty negotiations, developing countries like China have argued that patents limit their access to
green technologies. Based on these submissions, the May 2009 United Nations climate treaty
negotiating text contained proposals that weaken IP rights for green technologies.” (footnote omitted)).
274
See H.R. REP. NO. 111-143, at 36 (2009); H.R. amend. 187 to H.R. 2410, H.R. REP. NO. 111143, at 53 (June 10, 2009) (amending Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011,
H.R. 2410, 111th Cong. § 1120a (2009)) (“[I]t shall be the policy of the United States that, with respect
to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the President, the Secretary of State
and the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations should prevent any
weakening of, and ensure robust compliance with and enforcement of, existing international legal
requirements . . . for the protection of intellectual property rights related to energy or environmental
technology . . . .”). This amendment reflects the view that patents play an important role in encouraging
innovation—an opinion that is generally held by wealthy and developed nations. See Tove Iren S.
Gerhardsen, IP Issues May Go to ‘Higher Political Level’ in Copenhagen Amid Difficulties, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH (Dec. 9, 2009, 5:57 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/12/09/ip-issues-may-goto-%E2%80%98higher-political-level%E2%80%99-in-copenhagen-amid-difficulties (explaining that,
by and large, developed countries view patents as an important incentive for innovation, while
developing countries view them as an barrier).
275
See Press Release, IBM, IBM and World Business Council for Sustainable Development Team
with Nokia, Pitney Bowes and Sony to Establish Eco-Patent Commons (Jan. 14, 2008), available at
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/23280.wss (introducing the EPC and explaining how
the plan originated); see also Marc Sandy Block, Eco-Patent Commons: Selected Patents Made
Available to Benefit the Environment, IP LITIGATOR, Mar.–Apr. 2009, at 25, 25–26 (discussing the
history of the project).
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•

To promote and encourage cooperation and collaboration
between businesses that pledge patents and potential users to
foster further joint innovations and the advancement and
development of solutions that benefit the environment.276

This goal is achieved by requiring contributors to agree to the
following patent nonassertion pledge:
Accordingly, we irrevocably (except as specified below) pledge and covenant
to you that we will not assert any of our listed patents (including any
worldwide counterparts) against you for any infringing machine, manufacture,
process, or composition of matter claimed in such listed patent(s) where such
infringing item alone (or when included in a product or service)
reduces/eliminates natural resource consumption, reduces/eliminates waste
generation or pollution, or otherwise provides environmental benefit(s).277

Hence, the pool is aimed at the broad aggregation of patents rather than
at any specific avenue of research or product development. Although the
EPC pledge is not a binding contract, it is likely enforceable through the
doctrine of equitable estoppel.278
An obvious question is why patent holders would be at all motivated to
participate in the EPC. After all, the group guarantees participants nothing
in return for their pledges of nonassertion. An attorney closely involved
with the project has suggested that licensors might simply be willing to act
for the public good. “[T]he belief behind the Commons,” the attorney wrote
in a recent journal article, “is that major patent holders in various
industries have patents of moderate value that provide an environmental
benefit . . . [and] recognize that the resulting value to the world of
submitting would greatly outweigh the nominal benefit the patent could
derive from a royalty-generating program.”279 This prediction is quite
different from the Market Correction Hypothesis’s notion of self-interested
patent holders rationally seeking the rewards that come from cumulative
innovation.
276
Eco-Patent Commons, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., http://www.wbcsd.org/
work-program/capacity-building/eco-patent-commons.aspx (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
277
Eco-Patent Commons: Joining or Submitting Additional Patents to the Commons, 2on-Assert
Pledge, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 6, http://www.wbcsd.org/web/projects/
ecopatent/EcoPatentGroundRules.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
278
Equitable estoppel is a defense to patent infringement in which an implied license is found in a
patent holder’s misleading representation of permission. See, e.g., Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs.
Am., Inc., 103 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (contrasting legal estoppel from equitable estoppel);
AMP Inc. v. United States, 389 F.2d 448, 452–53 (Ct. Cl. 1968) (rejecting equitable estoppel as a basis
for finding an implied license to a later-acquired patent because there was no showing that the licensor
had made a false representation); AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 01 Civ 4872 (WHP), 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1214, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2004) (“It is axiomatic that to assert equitable estoppel, the
alleged infringer must have been aware of the patent at issue when it undertook its infringing
activities.”).
279
Block, supra note 275, at 26.
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But why would philanthropically motivated patent holders license their
patents under the EPC instead of simply donating the patents to the public
domain? Maintaining an active patent requires periodic payment of
maintenance fees (which presumably, the EPC’s contributors must continue
to pay), while a public donation might provide tax breaks.280 While there is
no clear answer to this question, an IBM executive has commented that
some companies might see the project as a platform for gaining footholds to
sell complementary goods and services or to facilitate the widespread
adoption of certain technological standards.281
To date, over 100 patents have been donated from 13 participating
companies.282 A recent empirical study indicates that most of these patents
are indeed related to the environment and are of at least moderate value.283
Even so, several patent licensing experts interviewed for this Article
doubted the EPC’s efficacy.284 Approximately 20% of inventions donated to
the initiative are expired patents and others are patent applications that have
not yet been granted.285 But some lawyers interviewed felt that the EPC’s
greatest weakness lies in the fact that its success cannot be measured:
Because licensees need not identify themselves, it is impossible to
determine whether any EPC patents are in fact being used.286
2. The GreenXchange.—Even more recently, a second patent
community formed around the goal of freely licensing green technologies.
This effort, called The GreenXchange (GX), originated from a presentation
that NIKE, Inc. (Nike) gave at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland.287 The discussion spurred by this presentation on “open-source
patents” led to meetings between Nike and Creative Commons, a nonprofit
well-known for its widely used public copyright licenses.288 Soon after,
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See I.R.S. Notice 2004-7, 2004-3 C.B. 310 (discussing the tax implications of donating
intellectual property, including patents, for charitable purposes).
281
See Bronwyn H. Hall & Christian Helmers, Innovation in Clean/Green Technology: Can Patent
Commons Help?, Presentation Before the Workshop on Innovation Without Patents 7 (June 12, 2010),
available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~bhhall/papers/HallHelmers10_ecopats_BW.pdf (quoting IBM’s
Vice President of Environmental Affairs, Wayne Balta).
282
Eco-Patent Commons: Eco-Patents Database, WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV.,
http://web.archive.org/web/20100108051311/http://www.wbcsd.org/plugins/GENERICDB/result.asp?D
BID=8&type=p&MenuId=MTU2MQ&doOpen=1&ClickMenu=LeftMenu&DBEntityTitle=&DBEntity
Text=&char70=&cbo68=&cbo69=&char71= (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
283
See Hall & Helmers, supra note 281, at 9, 18 (noting that patents pledged to the EPC are “more
valuable than the typical patent in a firm’s portfolio”).
284
As one executive who was interviewed stated, “[I]t’s highly questionable as to whether [the EcoPatent Commons has] had any impact.” Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #6 (Oct. 7, 2010).
285
See Hall & Helmers, supra note 281, at 24 (reporting these statistics).
286
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #1 (Sept. 10, 2010).
287
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #3 (Sept. 28, 2010).
288
Id.
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Yahoo! and Best Buy committed their support and the budding effort
officially launched in January 2010.289
The GX shares the EPC’s goal of encouraging green innovation but the
group’s approach is somewhat more business-minded. Project literature
encourages licensors to donate patents for free, for instance, but the GX
patent license also permits licensors to charge royalty fees.290 As John
Wilbanks of Creative Commons explained to the 2ew York Times, “We
don’t depend on altruism.”291 The GX license also allows licensors to limit
the range of subject matter they may choose to pledge based on geography
and fields of use.292 These licensing “toggles” bank on the idea that there is
sometimes a gap between a patent’s potential and realized value.293 For
example, Nike might wish to license patented rubber compositions to other
footwear makers but might not have a business interest in licensing the
same patents to tire manufacturers. A GX spokesperson explained that by
facilitating unexpected uses of patents in noncompetitive fields, the GX
aims to gather a valuable body of inventions.294
As a new effort, the GX’s ability to attract patent holders remains
unproven. One insider involved from the early stages reported that Nike
executives were deeply motivated by the idea that open patent licensing
could help the company gain new business footholds: “What Nike liked was
the idea that they could create new relationships with companies they might
not [otherwise] talk to.”295 What is a bit more puzzling though, is that some
insiders hope that GX will succeed in gathering so-called “byproduct
patents”—i.e., inventions that are not core to a patent holder’s business, but
rather, are a tangential product of day-to-day operations.296 Nike press
materials state that many “R&D companies create green technologies that
are not core to their business.”297 Insiders did not offer explanations for why
a company would pay application and maintenance fees for patents that are
not expected to generate any revenues.
289

See Press Release, Don Tapscott, The GreenXchange, Davos: Nike and Partners Launch the
GreenXchange (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://www.greenxchange.cc/info/release/1-27-2010.
290
See Pledge and License Types, GREENXCHANGE, http://www.greenxchange.cc (last visited Mar.
9, 2012) (explaining that the “Standard” license allows for royalty-free use while the “Standard PLUS”
license allows the patent holder to charge royalty fees).
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See Mary Tripsas, Everybody in the Pool of Green Innovation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2009, at N5
(comparing the GX and the EPC).
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Pledge and License Types, supra note 290 (“For example, the patent holder may restrict field of
use, geography, or require a payment.”).
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Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #3 (Sept. 28, 2010).
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Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #6 (Oct. 7, 2010).
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Id.
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NIKE, INC., Case Study: GreenXchange., in NIKE, INC. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT,
FISCAL YEARS 2007–2009, at 125, available at http://www.nikebiz.com/crreport/pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2012) (discussing Nike’s efforts related to the GX).
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While these questions remain open, it appears that, like the EPC, the
GX is not gathering patents that are complementary or that cover related
technologies. As of this writing, 463 patents have been donated to GX from
four participating companies.298 Nike, which contributed a lion’s share of
444 patents to the effort, provided a variety of technologies that describe
new types of environmentally friendly rubber.299 Examples of donations
from other organizations include a patent covering methods of using certain
types of proteins300 and a patent covering a method of converting printers
into cleaning devices.301
Ultimately, the EPC and the GX contradict the Market Correction
Hypothesis in two respects. First, these efforts are not targeting any specific
anticommons problems. That is, they are not purposefully aggregating
complementary patent rights whose distribution among multiple rights
holders is believed to impede research and development. Second, these
efforts appear to be motivated by charitable goals and thus do not reflect, as
the theory predicts, patent holders collectively selecting the gains of longterm innovation over the short-term profits that patents confer.302
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY
A. Implications for the Market Correction Hypothesis
The foregoing study suggests some important refinements to theory.
To begin, it is helpful to briefly revisit the Market Correction Hypothesis.
As explained in Part I, patent gridlock stems from the fact that product
research and development often require identifying and licensing multiple
patents held by different owners. The potential expense and legal
uncertainty of assembling complementary patent rights discourages
investments that can spur follow-on innovation.303 The Market Correction
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See All Organizations, GREENXCHANGE, http://www.greenxchange.cc/browse/all_organizations
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (reflecting these figures); see also 463 Assets, GREENXCHANGE,
http://www.greenxchange.cc/search (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (searchable database).
299
See, e.g., 463 Assets, supra note 298; Patent: Rubber Compositions with Increased Shelf Life
and Reduced Cure Temperatures and Times, GREENXCHANGE (Sept. 16, 2003), http://www.
greenxchange.cc/nike/rubber-compositions-with-increased-shelf-life-and-reduced-cur
(documenting
Nike’s donation of U.S. Patent No. 6,620,871).
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See Patent: US Patent 6,858,213 Mycobacterial Sulfaction Pathway Proteins and Methods of
Use Thereof, GREENXCHANGE (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.greenxchange.cc/ucberkeley/mycobacterialsulfation-pathway-proteins-and-methods-of-use-t (documenting U.C. Berkeley’s donation of U.S. Patent
No. 6,858,213).
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See Patent: Sheet Cleaner in a Multi-Station Printing Machine, GREENXCHANGE (Aug. 26,
2010),
http://www.greenxchange.cc/bestbuy/sheet-cleaner-in-a-multi-station-printing-machine
(documenting Best Buy’s donation of U.S. Patent No. 6,684,769).
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See Barnett, supra note 1, at 442.
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See supra Part I.A. (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the Market Correction
Hypothesis).
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Hypothesis posits that, under some circumstances, firms will lower such
transaction costs and legal uncertainties by sharing patents. The import of
this theory is that, through collective action, private actors “correct” the
government’s errors in distributing excessive patents to enhance cumulative
innovation.304
To evaluate this theory, this Article investigated a set of ideal test
cases. The examples in Part II include contemporary and historical patentsharing efforts that all purport to further cumulative innovation. In fact,
several of these episodes, including The SNP Consortium, the Open
Invention Network (OIN), and the Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association
(MAA), were explicitly cited in a recent article as support of the theory.305
Through interviews, firsthand observations, and independent research, this
Article revealed that the reality of patent sharing diverges from this
theoretical story in important respects.
Some of the communities examined were products of government
intervention. The Medicines Patent Pool (MPP) was inspired by the
hortatory messages that U.K. politicians expressed in the House of
Commons, in official government reports, and in statements to the press.306
Similarly, the NIH’s discouragement of SNP patents created a political
atmosphere in which public and private SNP-sharing efforts took hold and
succeeded.307 Along with such statements of encouragement, governments
and publicly funded entities have also done the hard work of planning,
designing, and implementing invention-sharing regimes. The MPP, for
instance, is the creation of UNITAID—an organization funded by European
tax dollars and hosted by the World Health Organization.308 Likewise, the
U.S. government’s dbSNP, which preceded the SNP Consortium, was
funded and administered by the NIH.309 Reaching further back in time, we
find that U.S. politicians designed and implemented the MAA against
industry protests.310
In other settings, governmental influence is less obvious but no less
potent. The Pool for Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical Diseases
(NTD Pool) is illustrative on this point. As the interviews referenced in
subpart II.A.2 reveal, this patent-sharing regime was designed, in part, to
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efforts to aggregate radio patents into what ultimately became RCA Corporation. See Merges & Nelson,
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leverage the preexisting FDA Priority Review Voucher system.311 One
interviewee described the FDA vouchers as a “direct link” between the
community and prospective members.312 From this perspective, the NTD
Pool “piggybacks” on an existing policy aimed at encouraging precisely the
same kind of innovation. Like the SNP Consortium, the MPP, and the
MAA, the NTD Pool does not align with the Market Correction
Hypothesis’s depiction of private actors correcting government
propertization errors. Rather, these examples show the active and visible
hand of public policy guiding patent sharing.313
In another divergence from the Market Correction Hypothesis, the
foregoing study reveals some of the most notable patent-sharing efforts do
not aim to encourage future innovations but rather are set on the backwardfacing goal of settling or preventing litigation over existing products. The
primary purpose of the OIN, for instance, is to serve as a bulwark against
long-anticipated litigation over the Linux operating system. This defensive
mission is reflected in the OIN patent license, which discourages lawsuits
over Linux but does not clearly facilitate the development of future
software products or innovations.314 An historical analogue to this effort is
the Bessemer Association, which was devised to settle a bitter litigation
over “blocking” patents relating to an existing method of steelmaking.315
Although the science of steelmaking improved during the late nineteenth
century, no historical sources point to the Bessemer Association as an
impetus for innovation.
Apart from resolving litigation, some of the communities examined
have a charitable aspect to them, suggesting that they may be motivated less
by private gain than by social goals. As a lawyer involved with the NTD
Pool stated, “GSK’s aim . . . was to be a good corporate citizen.”316
Similarly, an executive at Nike described The GreenXchange (GX), which
will soon be incorporated as a nonprofit, as driven “by a sense of corporate
responsibility.”317
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See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the NTD Pool).
Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source #8 (Feb. 7, 2011).
313
The U.S. government has also encouraged “precompetitive” collaboratives by enacting laws that
reduce antitrust penalties for such groups. See National Cooperative Research & Production Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4306 (2006). Some federal agencies such as the FDA and NIH have also
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Moving on to the actual substance of patent sharing, not all of the
communities examined are aggregating complementary patents. To
appreciate this fact, it is helpful to view complementarity as a spectrum. On
one end of the spectrum, patent owners can only derive value from their
individual inventions through aggregation. SNPs, which are only useful to
researchers in large numbers, demonstrate this type of “strict
complementarity.”318 Further down the spectrum, individual patents may be
valuable on their own but can also be combined in new and useful ways.
Cournot’s stylized example of the fusion of copper and zinc into brass
illustrates this type of relationship.319 In the context of patents, the fixeddose antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) that the MPP has targeted for
development are a comparable example.320 Finally, there is sometimes little
or no value in combining patents. This describes the relationships among
some of the patents sought by the Eco-Patent Commons (EPC) and the GX,
many of which relate to different fields of technology.321 Although these
efforts have the backing and participation of large patent holders, the
proverbial tragedy of the anticommons cannot be solved simply by
aggregating just any patents. This observation is by no means a negative
reflection of either effort—the EPC and the GX may make valuable
contributions to society. Neither effort, however, seems poised to weaken
patent gridlock that blocks the way to new innovations.
This observation highlights an important insight: Unlike tragedies of
the commons, tragedies of the anticommons involve property rights that are
interrelated. The degree to which patents are interrelated and the resulting
degree of patent gridlock that may exist within a given industry can be
highly contextual. As the examples discussed in this Article show,
complementarity can vary greatly depending on the kind of technology at
stake (e.g., SNPs versus drugs), and the stage of technological development
(e.g., early research versus late-stage development). Ultimately, a
community’s ability to overcome patent gridlock is not only a product of
the sheer number of patents it collects but also a product of the degree of
complementarity among those patents. As a result, although the Market
Correction Hypothesis may not apply to innovations that are years or
decades away, the theory may be entirely applicable when the contours of a
new technology are well-defined and near at hand.
We must be careful to note that these conclusions do not undermine the
potential value of collective patent licensing itself. To the contrary, several
examples in this Article reveal that, when properly guided by policymakers,
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patent sharing can sometimes effectively mitigate patent gridlock.322 The
SNP Consortium, for instance, effectively warded off a widely anticipated
research anticommons through the formation of a publicly accessible
genetic database.323 Likewise, legal commentators have noted that the MAA
enabled valuable innovation in the aircraft industry, at least in the
organization’s early years.324 In this respect, the Article provides empirical
support for the claim that anticommons problems can indeed be
counteracted through collective patent licensing. The new insight here
relates to how these institutions take form and sustain: Contrary to the
prevailing view, communities of innovation must be conceived of as
creatures of policy and not purely market forces.
The foregoing analysis can be reduced to a digestible set of insights:
This study does not support the hypothesis that innovation markets tend to
correct government propertization errors. To the contrary, it suggests that
valuable patent sharing can sometimes only occur when policymakers get
involved. When private patent holders have collectively organized without
government intervention, their goals have often been unrelated to furthering
long-term innovation. Defensive patent-sharing communities, for instance,
focus more on protecting existing products than on promoting future
product development. Charitable patent-sharing communities, as another
example, do not necessarily aggregate complementary patents. Those
efforts that are carefully targeted at overcoming anticommons problems are
largely products of policymaking. A corollary of these observations is that,
while the Market Correction Hypothesis may sometimes be accurate—this
Article is not an exhaustive study and thus does not foreclose this
possibility—the theory is mostly likely to apply only when a product is near
at hand. This is because it is easier to identify and gather complementary
upstream patents that might cover an identifiable class of products than it is
to gather patents that fall under the umbrella of a broad and nebulous
problem.
B. Recommendations
That patent gridlock has not been cured through private cooperation
alone is not an altogether pessimistic observation. As the foregoing
discussion notes, communities of innovation led by policymakers have
proven to be effective remedies to anticommons problems. What must be
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But see Ryan L. Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation? Evidence from
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considered, then, is how policymakers can most effectively encourage and
guide these kinds of institutions.325
The most obvious mechanism to encourage patent licensing that has
been discussed (and criticized) in the literature is compulsory licensing.
This solution lowers transaction costs by transferring the power to set
licensing fees from patent holders to neutral third parties—typically,
administrative agencies or special tribunals.326 In a more targeted way, some
have argued for mandatory royalty-free cross-licensing of all federally
funded inventions for research.327 While these ideas are valuable and
important, compulsory licensing is a relatively extreme form of intervention
and not widely available under U.S. law.328 Thus, solutions involving
compulsory licenses may have trouble gathering the necessary political
goodwill to get adopted. More moderate solutions are needed.
The communities of innovation examined in this Article point towards
alternative policy measures that are at once more moderate and more
targeted to address anticommons problems than compulsory licensing is.
These solutions define a spectrum of involvement: from issuing hortatory
statements, to offering various incentives, to directly designing and
implementing patent-sharing communities themselves.329 The paragraphs
that follow provide an overview of how policymakers informed by these
case studies can help to establish communities of innovation.
The least intrusive step that regulators can take is to encourage and
validate patent-sharing proposals through official statements. The MAA
provides a helpful example of how this type of intervention can work. The
institution itself was conceived of and endorsed by a committee of experts
appointed by President Wilson and was later declared legal under antitrust
laws by the U.S. Attorney General. Following this official sanction, the plan
took hold within private industry.330 Similarly, the MPP took form at the
urging of well-informed U.K. public servants. As mentioned in Part II, The
Lancet recently urged policymakers to become even more vocal in
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See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Mattioli, supra note 24, at 214 (proposing a compulsory licensing
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supporting the effort.331 These examples illustrate how, working in concert,
politicians and regulators can encourage meaningful exchanges through
declarations alone.
A second class of measures concerns substantive incentives. The NTD
Pool, which was keenly designed to bank off of FDA Priority Review
Vouchers (PRV), provides a helpful example of how such incentives could
be tailored.332 In its current design, the FDA PRV system rewards drug
developers, but not the patent holders that license intellectual property
rights to them. As a result, this incentive may draw licensees to the NTD
Pool, but not necessarily licensors.333 To more directly encourage patent
holders to share, the FDA could extend its voucher program to include
patent holders. The FDA could make PRVs available not only to drug
developers, but to all patent holders whose upstream innovations enabled
the downstream products that qualify for PRVs. This suggestion is one
example of an administrative “carrot” that could encourage valuable patent
community building.334
Finally, policymakers can take the bold step of funding and
establishing patent-sharing regimes themselves. As the NIH’s SNP database
shows, communities of innovation run by the public sector can be highly
effective at countering anticommons problems. By tailoring the scope of a
patent-sharing effort to specific classes of products—e.g., pediatric
ARVs—policymakers could target manageable and identifiable sets of
patents. Leading commentators have argued that the public sector is
actually in a very good position to make these sorts of determinations.335
Unbound by market pressures and shareholder demands, public entities are
well-positioned to administer sharing regimes and to mediate neutrally
between various interest groups.
From a political perspective, the government’s backing of communities
of innovation should not stir controversy. Patents themselves are figments
of policy, and—as the case studies in this Article show—patent
communities have long been instigated and guided by the public sector.
Moreover, these recommendations are modest. Unlike compulsory licensing
proposals,336 these suggestions encourage patent sharing rather than force it.
In this respect, they largely preserve incentives to innovate, and at the same
331
332
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time, enable the public sector to play an active and meaningful role in
instigating and guiding communities of innovation.
CONCLUSION
It should come as no surprise that the realities of patent sharing are
more complex than theory suggests. As Elinor Ostrom and other political
economists demonstrated, property sharing is highly dependent on
context.337 Indeed, the shape of each patent-sharing initiative discussed in
this Article is as unique as the particular circumstances—technological,
economic, and political—that inspired it. These stories of success, failure,
cooperation, and conflict provide several important refinements to our
understanding of the role of collective action in our patent system.
First, companies sometimes share patents in response to government
pressure. The Manufacturers’ Aircraft Association, for instance, was the
product of direct government intervention. The U.S. government conceived
of the pool and pressured the key patent holders, Wright and Curtiss, to
cooperate.338 In a more subtle way, the SNP Consortium formed in the wake
of the U.S. government’s own effort to gather patentable data.339 Today, the
Medicines Patent Pool is taking form under similar pressures. The effort
was conceived of by policymakers and has been spearheaded by a publicly
funded organization associated with the U.K. government.340 These
observations do not align with the Market Correction Hypothesis’s
depiction of private actors correcting government propertization errors.341
Second, some patent-sharing communities are focused on facilitating
the production and use of existing products, rather than encouraging the
development of future technologies. The primary purpose of the Open
Invention Network, for instance, is to serve as a bulwark against litigation
directed at the Linux operating system rather than to provide fertile ground
for future inventions.342 Likewise, the primary goal of the Bessemer
Association was to allow steel mills to practice an existing steelmaking
process.343
Third, some of the efforts discussed in this Article have a charitable
aspect to them, suggesting they are more driven by social goals than
economics. Broad charitable missions appear to encourage donations of
broad sets of patents, many of which are not complementary. In its most
337
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unqualified and optimistic form, the Market Correction Hypothesis assumes
that nearly any aggregation of patents is prima facie evidence of a market
correction. This view ignores the fact that, unlike a natural resource
commons, the patent anticommons is built on assets that are interrelated in
complicated ways. We cannot expect that the sharing of patents that are
unrelated or only loosely related will cure the dilemma of patent gridlock.
A corollary of this observation is that patent sharing may be most
capable of enhancing innovation in settings where specific patents, or at
least specific products, can be identified—typically, further toward the
“product” end of a development timeline. The Medicines Patent Pool, for
instance, targets pediatric antiretroviral drugs.344 Likewise, the Pool for
Open Innovation Against Neglected Tropical Diseases targets a clearly
defined set of specific diseases.345 At the far end of the spectrum, however,
efforts like the Eco-Patent Commons are aimed broadly at the problem of
environmental harm. Here, at the research stage, patents are more akin to
the presence of “dark matter” in the universe: their influence can be felt, but
they evade easy identification.
Underlying all of these observations are truths about the role of
collective action in our patent system. The Market Correction Hypothesis
proposes that patent holders, guided by an enlightened sense of self-interest,
will choose to reap the long-term gains of innovation over the short-term
gains that patents confer. What this theory overlooks, however, is the fact
that cooperation is always shaped by circumstance. Patent sharing regimes
are forged on diverse challenges and hopes. They can provide shelter from
outside threats as well as foundations on which to build for the future.
Perhaps most importantly, though, these communities cannot be expected to
form without governmental support.
The results of the ethnographic inquiry conducted in this Article should
not be thought of as a conclusion but rather as a first step. From here,
academics, policymakers, and the public can begin a new discussion about
how to build communities of innovation that will flourish and endure.
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